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Abstract
Mobile systems are generally composed of three layers of software: application
layer where third-party applications are installed, framework layer where Applica-
tion Programming Interfaces (APIs) are exposed, and kernel layer where low-level
system operations are executed. In this dissertation, we focus on security and vul-
nerability analysis of framework and application layers. Security mechanisms, such
as Android’s sandbox and permission systems, exist in framework layer, while mal-
ware scanners protects application layer. However, there are rooms for improvement
in both mechanisms. For instance, Android’s permission system is known to be im-
plemented in ad-hoc manner and not well-tested for vulnerabilities. Application
layer also focuses mainly on malware application detection, while different types of
harmful applications exist on application markets. This dissertation aims to close
these security gaps by performing vulnerability analysis on mobile frameworks and
detecting policy-violating applications. As a result of our analysis, we find various
framework-level vulnerabilities and we are able to launch serious proof-of-concept
attacks on both iOS and Android platforms. We also propose mechanisms for de-
tecting policy-violating applications and camouflaged applications. Our techniques
are shown to improve the security of mobile systems and have several impacts on
mobile industry.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mobile devices play a critical role in modern life and there are billions of mobile
users around the world. It is a great responsibility of platform providers to ensure
the security and privacy of mobile users. In this dissertation, we study the security of
application layer and framework layer of mobile systems. First, platform providers
incorporate several security mechanisms, such as application sandbox and permis-
sion access control, to the framework layer of mobile devices. Sandbox mechanism
isolates the code execution and data storage of applications on mobile devices to
minimize the damage potentially caused by malicious applications. At the same
time, access control mechanisms allow applications with appropriate permissions
to access important resources on mobile devices. Second, in the application layer,
platform providers inspect the applications when they are uploaded to the appli-
cation stores. They consequently remove the malicious applications once they are
detected.
There are several drawbacks in these mechanisms:
• Currently, there is no standard way of vulnerability analysis on both Android
and iOS frameworks. The lack of framework-specific vulnerability analysis
tools makes the security testing difficult potentially leading to various vulner-
abilities. On the other hand, ensuring security of mobile frameworks is not
trivial due to a wide variety of API types and vast presence of APIs. The
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frameworks are also constantly modified by various platform providers in a
very fast pace mobile environment.
• Security controls on mobile applications have been focusing on malwares,
which only account for a small percentage of mobile applications in the mar-
kets. There has been negligence over bad applications, which are less aggres-
sive than malwares, but still violate developers policies, such as intellectual
property right violations.
In this dissertation, we take the first step towards systematic analysis of vulnera-
bilities in mobile frameworks and detect policy-violating applications. My first two
work focus on vulnerability analysis of mobile frameworks and my last two work
study the policy-violating applications. In my first work, we perform vulnerability
analysis on iOS framework. In my second work, we perform vulnerability analy-
sis on Android framework. In both work, we consider a third-party application as
attacker. This attacker gains access to mobile resources by bypassing the security
mechanisms of mobile framework. The results of these two work are proof-of-
concept attacks that can be performed on mobile frameworks. In my third work, we
perform empirical analysis on the policy-violating applications and create detection
mechanisms for all applications violating Google Play policies. After that, in my
fourth work, we focus on detecting camouflaged applications, which are also part
of policy-violating applications.
1.1 Identifying Vulnerabilities in iOS Framework
iOS is Apples mobile operating system, which is used on iPhone, iPad and iPod
touch. Any third-party applications developed for iOS devices are required to go
through Apples application vetting process and appear on the official iTunes App
Store upon approval. When an application is downloaded from the store and in-
stalled on an iOS device, it is given a limited set of privileges, which are enforced
2
by iOS application sandbox. Although details of the vetting process and the sand-
box are kept as black box by Apple, it was generally believed that these iOS security
mechanisms are effective in defending against malwares.
In this work, we propose a generic attack vector that enables third-party appli-
cations to launch attacks on non-jailbroken iOS devices. They include attacks via
dynamically loaded frameworks and attacks via private C functions. With these
attack vectors, an attacker obtains access to both public and private APIs of iOS
framework. Following this generic attack mechanism, we are able to construct mul-
tiple proof-of-concept attacks. They include cracking device PIN, blocking phone
calls, taking snapshots without users awareness, sending SMS and emails and post-
ing tweets to Twitter. Our applications embedded with the attack codes have passed
Apples vetting process and work as intended on non-jailbroken devices. Our proof-
of-concept attacks have shown that Apples vetting process and iOS sandbox have
weaknesses which can be exploited by third-party applications.
We further provide corresponding mitigation strategies for both vetting and
sandbox mechanisms, in order to defend against the proposed attack vector. We
suggest using fuzzing tests and dynamic taint analysis during Apple’s vetting pro-
cess. We also believe that iOS sandbox can be improved by dynamic parameter
inspection, privileged IPC verification, service delegation enhancement, and system
notifiers for sensitive functionalities.
1.2 Identifying Vulnerabilities on Android Frame-
work
Android requires third-party applications to request for permissions when they ac-
cess critical mobile resources, such as users’ personal information and system op-
erations. For instance, only applications with android.permission.CAMERA
permission are given access to phone cameras.
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In this work, we present the attacks that can be launched without permissions.
We group the Android APIs into three categories: system services, system appli-
cations, and dynamically register broadcasts. To identify all vulnerabilities, we
perform inter-procedural call graph analysis on system services and discover all
Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL) interfaces that are not protected by
any permission checking or Linux ID checking mechanisms. We then carry out
a component analysis on system applications so as to locate the exposed and un-
protected broadcast receivers, activities and services. After that, we conduct an
intra-procedural data-flow analysis to find out unprotected dynamically registered
broadcasts from both system services and system applications. The result of our
analysis is a systematic overview of unprotected Android APIs. These unprotected
APIs provide a way of accessing resources without any permissions.
We then exploit selected unprotected APIs and launch a number of attacks on
Android phones. In particular, we launch Java reflection attacks, broadcast injec-
tion attacks, broadcast hijacking attacks, malicious activity launch attacks, activity
hijacking attacks, malicious service launch attacks, and service hijacking attacks.
We discover that without requesting for any permissions, an attacker can access to
device ID, phone service state, SIM card state, Wi-Fi and network information, as
well as user setting information, such as airplane, location, NFC, USB and power
modes of mobile devices. An attacker can also disturb Bluetooth discovery services,
and block the incoming emails, calendar events, and Google documents. Moreover,
an attacker can set volumes of devices and trigger alarm tones and ringtones that
users personally set for their devices. An attacker can also launch camera, mail,
music and phone applications even when the devices are locked.
We compare our research on two Android versions, and discover that as plat-
form providers incorporate more APIs, the number of unprotected APIs increases
and new attacks become possible. This is contrary to the common belief that the
security of a new version should improve, since many security flaws in an old ver-
sion are reported and fixed. We thus suggest platform providers to inspect Android
4
frameworks systematically before releasing new versions.
1.3 Detecting Policy-Violating Applications
To ensure quality and trustworthiness of mobile apps, Google Play store imposes
developer policies that cover various aspects, including intellectual property rights,
spams and advertisements. Once an app is reported for exhibiting suspicious behav-
iors that violate app policies, it is removed from the store to protect users. Currently,
Google Play store relies on mobile users’ feedbacks to identify violations.
Our work takes the first step towards understanding these reported apps by per-
forming empirical analysis on real-life app samples. We crawl 302 policy-violating
Android apps, which are reported in the Reddit forum by mobile users and are later
removed from the Google Play store. Our empirical analysis reveals that many vi-
olating behaviors have not been studied well by industry or research communities.
We discover that 53% of the reported apps are either copying popular apps, such as
Bejeweled Blitz, Candy Crush, Minecraft, Angry Bird, and Fruit Ninja or violating
copy-rights or trademarks of brands, such as Adobe, Disney, Minion, Despicable
Me, and Pikachu. Moreover, 49% of reported apps are violating ads policies by
sending push notifications, adding homescreen icon and changing browser settings.
Many apps also show malware-like behaviors, such as downloading malicious files
to users’ mobile phones, redirecting users to other apps on the market and accessing
to users’ PayPal account.
Based on our empirical analysis results, we extract 208 features for differentiat-
ing bad apps from benign apps. Our features cover use of brand names and other
keywords, third-party libraries, network activities, meta data, permissions, and sus-
picious API calls originated from third-party libraries. The first three groups of
features are derived from empirical analysis of our reported app samples, while the
last three groups of features are based on their bad behaviors. We apply 10 machine
learning classifiers on the extracted features to detect reported bad apps. Our ex-
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periment result shows that we can detect them with 86.80% true positive rate and
13.6% false negative rate. Our work highlights the problem of policy-violating apps
and suggests reconsidering the current strategy in maintaining good quality mobile
app markets.
1.4 Detecting Camouflaged Applications
Application plagiarism or application cloning is an emerging threat in mobile appli-
cation markets. It reduces profits of original developers and sometimes even harms
the security and privacy of users. In this work, we introduce a new concept, called
camouflaged applications, where external features of mobile applications, such as
icons, screenshots, application names or descriptions, are copied.
We then propose a scalable detection framework, which can find these suspi-
ciously similar camouflaged applications. To accomplish this, we apply text-based
retrieval methods and content-based image retrieval methods in our framework. Our
framework is implemented and tested with 30,625 Android applications from the
official Google Play market. The experiment results show that even the official
market is comprised of 477 potential camouflaged victims, which cover 1.56% of
tested samples.
Our work highlights that these camouflaged applications not only expose poten-
tial security threats but also degrade qualities of mobile application markets. Our
work also analyzes the behaviors of detected camouflaged applications and calcu-
late the false alarm rates of the proposed framework.
1.5 Contributions and Impact
We summarize the contributions of this dissertation in the following:
• We perform different types of vulnerability analysis to uncover APIs that can
be mis-used by malicious applications. Our analysis ranges from reverse en-
6
gineering of iOS framework to call graph analysis and data flow analysis on
Android framework. We use a third-party application as an attacker, which
can bypass default security mechanisms of mobile frameworks. We are able to
launch serious proof-of-concept attacks in both iOS and Android platforms.
These attacks have been reported to respective platform providers, and are
fixed in later versions of mobile frameworks.
• We take the first step towards understanding policy-violating applications by
performing empirical analysis on real-life application samples. We also cre-
ate several detection mechanisms based on machine learning and information
retrieval algorithms. Our mechanisms are shown to be effective in detecting
policy-violating applications.
Our work have great impact on mobile security industry affecting billions of
mobile users worldwide. Our findings on iOS framework have been reported to Ap-
ple security team. Our team engaged in a conference call with them to assist them
in understanding and patching vulnerabilities. Apple assigns Common Vulnerabili-
ties and Exposures (CVE) number “CVE-2013-0957” to the reported vulnerabilities
and publicly acknowledges our contributions [4]. The vulnerabilities are patched in
new iOS versions. Moreover, our discovery has been reported by the news media
including Straits Times [80] and Singapores Today newspapers [70]. Our findings
on Android framework have been reported to Google and Google has publicly ac-
knowledged our contribution in its Security Bulletin in March 2016 [35]. The re-
ported vulnerabilities are also assigned with CVE number “CVE-2016-0831 ” and
later are fixed on new Android version. Moreover, we obtained cash reward from
the Android Security Rewards Program for reporting these vulnerabilities.
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1.6 Organization of the Dissertation
The reminder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 investigates
vulnerabilities of iOS framework and Chapter 3 studies vulnerabilities of Android
framework. Chapter 4 conducts empirical analysis on policy-violating applications
and discusses their detection algorithm. Chapter 5 proposes a method for detecting
camouflaged applications. Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions of this disserta-
tion and discuss future directions.
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Chapter 2
Launching Generic Attacks on iOS
with Approved Third-Party
Applications
2.1 Introduction
Digital mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, have been increasingly
used for personal and business purposes in recent years. iOS from Apple is one
of the most popular mobile operating systems in terms of the number of users. By
Jan 2013, 500 millions of iOS devices had been sold worldwide and Apples iTunes
App Store contained over 800,000 iOS third-party applications, which had been
downloaded for more than 40 billion times [45].
Third-party applications are pervasively installed on iOS devices as they provide
various functions that significantly extend the usability of the mobile devices. On
the other hand, these third-party applications pose potential threats to personal and
business data stored on the devices. Thus, Apple adopts various security measures
on its iOS platform to protect the device from malicious third-party applications.
Among these security measures, Apples application vetting process and the iOS ap-
plication sandbox are considered as the fundamental mechanisms that protect users
9
from security and privacy exploits.
Each iOS third-party application is required to go through a vetting process
before it is published on the official iTunes App Store, which is the only source
of obtaining applications without jailbreaking an iOS device. Although details of
the vetting process are kept secret, it is generally regarded as highly effective since
no harmful malware on non-jailbroken devices has been reported on iTunes App
Store [75] [29]. Only graywares, which stealthily collect sensitive user data, were
found on iTunes Store. These graywares were immediately removed from the store
upon discovery [81].
When an application is downloaded and installed on an iOS device, it is given a
limited set of privileges [39], which are enforced by the application sandbox. With
the sandbox restrictions, an application cannot access files and folders of other ap-
plications. In order to access the required user data or control system hardware (e.g.
Bluetooth or WiFi), applications need to call respective iOS APIs which are hooked
by the sandbox so that validations of these API invocations are performed dynam-
ically. The sandbox mechanism serves as the last line of defense which restricts
malicious applications from accessing privileged system services, abusing user data
or exploiting resources of other applications.
Due to the closed-source nature of iOS platform, the implementation details of
security mechanisms used by iOS (including vetting process and application sand-
box) are not officially documented. As a result, to our best knowledge, there is no
systematic security analysis conducted for iOS platform, which has been generally
believed as one of the most secure commodity operating systems [57].
In this work, we make the first attempt in constructing generic attacks on iOS
platform. Existing ad hoc attacks usually require root privilege [62] [63] [18] and
thus work only on jailbroken iOS devices. In contrast, our attacks are intended to
work on non-jailbroken iOS devices, which are protected by both vetting process
and application sandbox. Thus, we propose an attack vector which include two at-
tack stages: 1) In the first stage, malicious applications which are embedded with
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attack codes need to pass Apples vetting process in order to appear in the official
iTunes App Store; 2) In the second stage, after users have downloaded these appli-
cations onto their iOS devices, the attack codes need to bypass the restriction of the
iOS sandbox in order to perform malicious functionalities. We realize both attack
stages by exploiting the weaknesses of the vetting process and the iOS sandbox.
With the proposed generic attack vector, we implement seven proof-of-concept at-
tacks, such as cracking device PIN and taking screenshots without users awareness,
which impose serious threats to the security and privacy of iOS users. Most of our
attacks implemented work on both iOS 5 and iOS 6. We implement multiple iOS
applications and embed our attack codes into these applications, which are then sub-
mitted to the iTunes App Store. These applications with attack codes have passed
the vetting process and all our attacks work effectively on non-jailbroken iOS de-
vices1. Our proof-of-concept attacks and further validation experiments indicate
that the current vetting process and iOS sandbox have vulnerabilities that can be ex-
ploited by malicious third-party applications to escalate their privileges and launch
serious attacks on non-jailbroken iOS devices.
In order to defend against the proposed attacks, we further discuss several miti-
gation methods which could enhance both vetting process and iOS application sand-
box. Some of these methods utilize existing iOS security features, thus can be con-
veniently implemented and deployed on the current iOS platform. We have notified
Apple all of our findings and shared all our attack codes with Apples product se-
curity team. By the time the paper was accepted, Apple is still in the progress of
addressing the security issues we have discovered.
In summary, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• We provide a generic attack vector which exploits the weaknesses of both
vetting process and iOS application sandbox. The attack vector consists of
two attack stages and can be used to construct serious attacks that work on
1Due to privacy concerns, we embedded secret triggers in our applications so that public users
will not be affected by the attack codes in these applications.
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non-jailbroken iOS devices.
• We implement seven proof-of-concept attacks with the attack vector pro-
posed. We embed these attack codes into multiple applications we imple-
mented and all the applications are able to pass the vetting process and appear
on official iTunes Store.
• We suggest several mitigation methods to defend against our attacks. These
methods include improvements on both the vetting process and the applica-
tion sandbox, which can be deployed on the iOS platform conveniently.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we define the
background and our threat model. In Section 3.3, we describe generic attack vector,
and in Section 3.4, we show a set of proof-of-concept attacks. In Section 2.4, we
discuss mitigation strategies. In Section 3.6, we provide some discussions on our
research. In Section 3.7, we summarize the related work. Finally, we conclude the
chapter in Section 2.7.
2.2 Background and Threat Model
2.2.1 iOS Platform Overview
iOS platform follows a closed-source model, where source code of the underlying
architecture and implementation details of its security mechanisms are not available
to the public. Though it is debatable whether such obscurity provides better security,
iOS has been generally believed as one of the most secure commodity operating
systems [57]. Unlike other mobile platforms, third-party applications on iOS are
given a more restricted set of privileges [39]. In addition, any third-party application
developed for iOS must go through Apples application vetting process before it is
published on the official iTunes App Store. While some users and developers favor
to have such restrictions for better security, others prefer to have more controls
12
over the device for additional functionalities, such as allowing to install pirated
software and allowing applications to change the themes of the device. To attain
such extended privileges, an iOS device needs to be jailbroken. Jailbreaking is a
process of installing modified kernel patches which allow a user to have root access
of the device so that any unsigned third-party applications can run on it. Although
jailbreaking is legal [20], it violates Apples End User License Agreement and voids
the warranties of the purchased devices. Jailbreaking is also known to expose to
potential security attacks [62] [63].
Application Vetting Process. Without jailbreaking a device, the only way of
installing a third-party application on iOS is via the official iTunes App Store. Any
application that is submitted to iTunes Store needs to be reviewed by Apple before
it is published on the store. This review process is known as Apples application
vetting process. The vetting covers several aspects, including detection of malware,
detection of copyright violations, and quality inspection of submitted applications.
Although the vetting process is kept secret by Apple, it is generally regarded as
highly effective as no harmful malware has been reported on iTunes Store [75] [29].
Only grayware (which stealthily collects user data) had been reported and was re-
moved from the store upon reporting [29] [81].
Application Sandbox. iOS utilizes another security measure application sand-
box to restrict privileges of third-party applications running on a device. The sand-
box is implemented as a set of fine-grained access controls, enforced at the kernel
level. Under the sandbox restrictions, an application cannot access files and folders
of other applications. In order to access user data or control system hardware, ap-
plications also need to call respective Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
provided on iOS. These APIs are hooked by the sandbox so that validations of API
invocations can be performed dynamically. The sandbox serves as the last line of
security defense which limits malicious applications from accessing system services
or exploiting resources of other applications.
iOS Frameworks and APIs. To facilitate development of third-party applica-
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tions, a collection of frameworks are provided in Cocoa Touch [11], which include
both public frameworks and private frameworks. Public frameworks are application
libraries officially provided to third-party developers while private frameworks are
intended only for Apples internal developers. Each framework provides a set of
APIs with which applications can access required system resources and services.
Similar to frameworks, APIs can also be categorized into public APIs and private
APIs.
Public APIs allow third-party applications to access a limited set of user infor-
mation and control hardware of iOS devices, such as camera, Bluetooth and WiFi.
In contrast, private APIs are the APIs that are meant to be used by Apples internal
developers. Private APIs may exist in both public and private frameworks. Though
not officially documented, private APIs include various functions which could be
used by a third-party application to escalate its restricted privileges. Thus, Apple
explicitly forbids third-party developers from using private APIs and rejects applica-
tions once the use of private APIs is detected. On the other hand, private APIs can
still be used by applications that are designed to run on jailbroken devices. Such
applications are available through Cydia [32], which is an unofficial application
market built for jailbroken iOS devices.
2.2.2 Threat Model
In this work, we are interested in finding out the possible attacks which can be per-
formed by third-party applications on non-jailbroken iOS devices, as illusrated in
Figure 2.1. The success of such attacks depends on two major factors: 1) whether
the corresponding malicious applications can pass Apples vetting process and ap-
pear in the official iTunes App Store; and 2) whether malicious function calls can
bypass the restriction of the iOS sandbox. We embed all our proof-of-concept attack
codes in the applications we develop, which have passed Apples vetting process and
have been digitally signed by Apple. Thus, our attacks embedded in these applica-
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Figure 2.1: Threat Model
tions are able to work on both jailbroken and non-jailbroken iOS devices.
2.3 Generic Attack Vector
As introduced in Section 2, iOS private APIs exist in both private frameworks and
part of public frameworks. When used by third-party applications, private APIs
may provide additional privileges to the applications and thus are explicitly forbid-
den by the vetting process. We choose to utilize private APIs to construct our attacks
which perform various malicious functionalities. In this section, we first present two
ways of dynamically invoking private APIs which enable the malicious applications
to pass the vetting process without being detected. Such dynamic loading mecha-
nisms guarantee the success of the first stage in the proposed attack vector. For the
second attack stage, in order to identify useful private APIs that are not restricted
by iOS application sandbox, we manually analyze and test each iOS framework.
Utilizing the useful private APIs we identified, we manage to implement multiple
serious attacks that cover a wide range of privileged functionalities. These attacks
can be embedded in any third-party applications, and they work effectively on non-
jailbroken iOS devices. Although our attack vector includes two stages, these two
stages are not isolated - what private API needs to be utilized decides the way of
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its dynamic invocation. Thus, in the following, we first use SMS-sending and PIN-
cracking attacks as two examples to explain the underlying mechanisms of the entire
attack vector. We then introduce other attacks we implemented utilizing the same
attack vector and discuss the implications of these attacks.
2.3.1 Attacks via Dynamically Loaded Frameworks
When implementing a third-party iOS application that uses private APIs, the
normal process is to link the corresponding framework statically (in the appli-
cations Xcode [23] project), and import the framework headers in the applica-
tions source code. For example, if a developer wants to send SMS programmati-
cally in his application, CoreTelephony.framework needs to be linked, and
CTMessage-Center.h needs to be imported in the application code. After
preparing those preconditions, the SMS-sending private API can then be called as
follows:
1 [[CTMessageCenter sharedMessageCenter]
2 sendSMSWithText:@"A testing SMS"
3 serviceCenter:nil
4 toAddress:@"+19876543210"];
In the above code, the static method sharedMessageCenter returns an
instance of CTMessageCenter class, and then invokes the private API call
sendSMSWithText:serviceCenter:toAddress:, which performs the
SMS-sending functionality on iOS 5. Third-party application can utilize this
method to send premium-rate SMS, and the sent SMS will not even appear in the
SMS outbox (more precisely, it does not appear in the default iOS Message appli-
cation2). Thus, a user would be totally unaware of such malicious behavior until the
user receives his next phone bill.
However, this standard way of invoking private APIs can be easily detected by
2Another way of sending SMS programmatically on iOS 5 is to utilize
MFMessageComposeViewController. However, this method is easy to be noticed as
the SMS sent would appear in the default Message application.
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the vetting process, even though only the executable binary of the compiled appli-
cation is submitted for vetting. One way of detecting this API call is to simply use
string matching (e.g., grep) on the binary, as the name of the function call appears
in the binarys objc methnamesegment (and also other segments). Moreover,
the framework name and class name also appear in the binary as imported symbols.
In this example SMS-sending code, although CoreTelephony is a public frame-
work, CTMessageCenter.h is a private header (i.e., CTMessageCenter is
a private class); thus, importing it in the source code can be detected by perform-
ing static analysis on the applications binary file. In order to pass Apples vetting
process, the application cannot link the framework statically.
To avoid being detected, the framework has to be loaded dynamically and the
required classes and methods need to be located dynamically. In our attacks, we
utilize Objective-C runtime classes and methods to achieve this goal. The example
SMS attack code that illustrates the dynamic loading mechanism is given as follows:
1 NSBundle *b = [NSBundle bundleWithPath:@"/System/Library
2 /Frameworks/CoreTelephony.framework"];
3 [b load];
4 Class c = NSClassFromString(@"CTMessageCenter");
5 id mc = [c performSelector:NSSelectorFromString(@"sharedMessage
6 Center")];
7 // call "sendSMSWithText:serviceCenter:toAddress:" dynamically
8 by utilizing NSInvocation
In the above code, the first two lines are used to load the CoreTelephony
framework dynamically, without linking this framework in the applications source
code. The path of this library is fixed on every iOS device, which is un-
der the /System/Library/Frameworks/ folder. Note that not only pub-
lic frameworks can be loaded dynamically, private frameworks (which is under
/System/Library/Private-Frameworks/) can also be loaded dynami-
cally using the same method. According to our experiments, Apples sandbox does
not check the parameter of [NSBundle load] to forbid accessing these frame-
works under /System/Library folder.
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NSClassFromString at the third line is a function which can locate the
corresponding class in memory by passing it the class name, which is similar
to the “Class.forName()” method in Java reflection. At the fourth line,
the sharedMessage-Center method is called via “performSelector:”.
At last, in order to call a method with more than 2 parameters (which
is “sendSMSWithText:serviceCenter:toAddress:”in this case), the
NSInvocation class is utilized.
Although the above code dynamically invokes the private API call, it may need
certain obfuscation in order to avoid the detection from static analysis during the
vetting process3. The last step of generating the actual attack code is to obfuscate
all the strings appearing in the above example code. There are various ways of ob-
fuscating strings in the source code. One simple technique is to create a constant
string which includes all 52 letters (both upper and lower cases), 10 digits and com-
mon symbols. Then all the strings appeared in the above code can be generated dy-
namically at runtime by selecting corresponding positions from this constant string.
Some of our applications utilize this method to obfuscate strings in the attack codes,
and some others adopt a complex obfuscation mechanism, which involves bitwise
operations and certain memory stack operations that are more difficult to be de-
tected.
2.3.2 Attacks via Private C Functions
Information about private Objective-C classes and methods in the Cocoa Touch
frameworks can be obtained from the iOS runtime headers [65], which are gen-
erated using runtime introspection tool such as RuntimeBrowser [67]. An example
of directly utilizing these Objective-C private APIs has been introduced in the previ-
ous subsection. However, Objective-C private classes and methods are not the only
3Actually according to our experiments, obfuscation may not be necessary, as the vetting process
does not seem to check all text segments in the binary. In our experiments, we have tried to embed
this SMS-sending code in one application which does not utilize obfuscation, and the application
passed the vetting process.
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private APIs we are able to use in third-party applications.
When we reverse engineer the binary files of each framework, we find that there
are a number of C functions in these frameworks that can be invoked by our applica-
tion, which do not appear in the iOS runtime headers [65] and cannot be found with
RuntimeBrowser [67]. In order to invoke these C functions, we need to dynami-
cally load the framework binary and locate the function at runtime. The following
code segment is part of our PIN-cracking code, which illustrates how we realize the
dynamic invocation for private C functions.
1 void *b = dlopen("/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks
2 /MobileKeyBag.framework/MobileKeyBag", 1);
3 int (*f)(id, id, id) = dlsym(b, "MKBKeyBagChangeSystemSecret");
4 ...
5 int r = f(oldpwd, newpwd, pubdict);
6 ...
In the above code segment, we use dlopen() to load the binary file of the
private framework MobileKeyBag, which returns an opaque handle for this dy-
namic library. Utilizing this handle and dlsym(), we are then able to locate the
address where the given symbol MKBKeyBagChangeSystemSecret is loaded
into memory. This address is then casted into a function pointer so that it can be
directly invoked later on in our attack code. Although the above code segment may
look simple, it is actually not easy to identify which C functions we should invoke
to serve for our attack purpose, especially when only framework binary is given.
Even after the C functions are identified and located, it takes further tedious work
to figure out the correct parameter types and values to pass to the C functions. And
in many cases, even all parameters are correct, these functions may be restricted by
iOS sandbox and thus will not function correctly within third-party applications. To
speed up the manual reverse engineering process when analyzing the given frame-
work binaries, we build our own static analysis tool (which is based on IDA Pro.)
to disassemble the framework binary and obtain assembly instructions that are rela-
tively easy to read.
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By manually analyzing the private framework ManagedConfiguration,
we find out that the changePasscodeFrom:to:outError: method of
MCPasscodeManager is used to reset the password of the iOS device. However,
we are not able to directly invoke this Objective-C method because the device needs
to be “unlocked” first with current device password (possibly due to sandbox re-
strictions). Thus, we need to find a way of bypassing such restriction. Digging into
the assembly code of the changePasscodeFrom:to:outError: method,
we find out that it eventually invokes the MKBKeyBagChangeSystemSecret
C function in MobileKeyBag to reset the password, which is allowed to be
directly invoked under the sandbox restrictions. Further analysis and experi-
ments are then conducted to figure out the correct parameters used to invoke
MKBKeyBagChangeSystemSecret.
Our analysis reveals that the MKBKeyBagChangeSystemSecret func-
tion accepts three parameters, all of which have the type of (NSData*).
The first parameter is the data of the old password, which can be con-
verted from password string. The second parameter is the data of the
new password. The third parameter, however, is an NSDictionary
containing the keyboard type of the current password, which must be
converted into NSData with [NSPropertyListSerialization
dataFromPropertyList:format:errorDescription:]. One
simple way of obtaining this NS-Dictionary data is to utilize the private
framework ManagedConfiguration. However, in our attack code, to
minimize the number of frameworks loaded, we utilize another private C func-
tion MKBKeyBagCopySytemSecretBlob4 in MobileKeyBag to obtain this
NSDictionary, which is then passed to MKBKeyBagChangeSystemSecret
as the third parameter.
4Note that it is not a spelling error in this MKBKeyBagCopySytemSecretBlob function.
The key word “System” in this function name is spelled as “Sytem” by Apples programmers. This
detail further shows that in this attack, we utilize a function which Apple programmers may not
expect to be used by third-party applications.
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After this MKBKeyBagChangeSystemSecret function is successfully in-
voked, the rest of the attack code is straight forward we simply use brute force
to crack the password. 4-digit PIN has been widely used to lock iOS devices and
has a password space of 104. When using our application to crack a device PIN on
iPhone 5, it takes 18.2 minutes on the average (of 16 trials on two iPhone 5 devices)
to check the whole PIN space (104). This gives an average speed of 9.2 PINs per
second. To further speed up the cracking, we build a PIN dictionary so that common
PINs are checked first. If the given PIN is in birthday format (mmdd/ddmm), it takes
about 40 seconds to crack the PIN on average. Note that since our PIN-cracking at-
tack uses the low level C functions, it will not trigger the “wrong password” event
on the iOS device which is implemented at higher level (Objective-C functions) in
the framework code. Thus, there is no limit on the number of attempts for our brute
force attacks when cracking the device PIN. It is the same procedure to crack 4-digit
PIN and complex password using our method, but the latter will take much longer
time than PIN due to its large password space.
2.3.3 Other Implemented Attacks and Implications
The SMS-sending attack and the PIN-cracking attack introduced above explain how
the entire attack vector is constructed. The former uses private Objective-C func-
tions (Section 3.1), while the latter uses private C functions (Section 3.2). With the
same dynamic invocation mechanisms which are able to bypass the vetting process,
other attacks can also be implemented, as long as we can identify sensitive private
APIs that are overlooked by the iOS sandbox.
We manually analyze the 180+ public and private iOS frameworks and man-
age to identify seven sets of sensitive APIs that are not restricted by iOS sandbox.
Utilizing these APIs and the dynamic invocation mechanisms, we implement seven
attacks, which are listed in Table 2.1. The corresponding frameworks and key APIs
utilized are listed in Table 2 in the appendix. We embed our attack codes in multi-
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Attack Name Description iOS 5 iOS 6 iPhone iPad
PIN-cracking Crack and retrieve the PIN of
the device
X X X X
Call-blocking Block all incoming calls or
the calls from specified num-
bers
X X X -
Snapshot-
taking
Continuously take snapshots
for current screen (even the
app is at background)
X X - X
Secret-filming Open camera secretly and
take photos or videos without
the users awareness
X X X X
Tweet-posting Post tweets on Twitter with-
out users interaction
X X X X
SMS-sending Send SMS to specified num-
bers without the users aware-
ness
X - X -
Email-sending Send emails using users sys-
tem email accounts without
the users awareness
X - X X
Table 2.1: The Seven Attacks Implemented and their Applicability
ple applications we develop, and all those applications have passed Apples vetting
process and appeared in the official iTunes App Store.
Most of the attacks in Table 2.1 work on both iOS 5 and iOS 6 (which is the
default iOS version on iPhone 5). The call-blocking and SMS-sending attacks do
not work on iPad, simply because iPad does not have corresponding functionalities
since it is not a phone device. The secret-filming attack can be implemented purely
with iOS public APIs. The last two attacks (SMS-sending and email-sending) cur-
rently only work on iOS 5, but not iOS 6. The APIs of sending SMS and emails
on iOS 6 have been substantially changed to prevent such attacks (which will be
further analyzed in Section 4).
The severity of most of our attacks would be significantly increased when the
attack code is embedded in an application that can keep running at the background.
Take the snapshot attack as an example. By calling the private API [UIWindow
createScreenIOSurface], an application can capture the current screen con-
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Attacks Frameworks Classes Functions
PIN-
cracking
MobileKeyBag - MKBKeyBagChangeSystemSecret
MKBKeyBagCopySytemSecret-
Blob
Call-
blocking
CoreTelephony - CTTelephonyCenterGetDefault
CTTelephonyCenterAddObserver
CTCallCopyAddress
CTCallDisconnect
Snapshot-
taking
UIKit UIWindow
UIImage
createScreenIOSurface
initWithIOSurface:
Secret-
filming
AVFoundation
CoreMedia
CoreVideo
AVCaptureDevice
AVCapture-
DeviceInput
AVCaptureV-
ideoDataOutput
AVCaptureSes-
sion
devices
deviceInputWithDevice:error:
setSampleBufferDelegate:queue:
startRunning
Tweet-
posting
Twitter TWTweetCompose
ViewController
setCompletionHandler:
setInitialText:
send:
SMS-
sending
CoreTelephony CTMessageCenter sharedMessageCenter
sendSMSWith-
Text:serviceCenter:toAddress:
Email-
sending
Message
AppSupport
MailAccount
CPDistribut-
edMessaging-
Center
defaultMailAccountForDelivery
uniqueId
centerNamed:
sendMessageAndReceiveReply-
Name:userInfo:error:
The symbol of “-” in the Class field indicates that the corresponding attack does
not utilize any Objective-C classes, but only utilizes private C functions.
Table 2.2: The Frameworks and Key APIs Utilized for the Seven Attacks Imple-
mented
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tent of the device. When continuously running at the background, this application
can take snapshots of the device periodically, and send these snapshots back to the
developers server for further analysis5. Such snapshot-taking attack may reveal
users email content, photos and even bank account information, thus it should be
avoided on any mobile devices.
Similar to the snapshot-taking attack, the call-blocking and PIN-cracking attacks
also become more serious when they are used in an application that can continuously
run at the background, which have been verified in our experiments. However, the
secret-filming attack does not work when in background. The current implementa-
tion of the iOS camera service requires that an application utilizing this service be
not in the background status. Nevertheless, even if the secret-filming attack works
only when the application is in the foreground, it is still a serious threat to user
privacy. Considering that when a user is playing a game on the iOS device, and
the game secretly opens the cameras and takes photos periodically without the users
notice. In our experiments, we have verified that both front and back cameras can be
used, and the sound can be muted when taking videos or photos programmatically
in our applications.
We emphasize that all these attacks are implemented with secret triggers in the
applications that are submitted to iTunes Store. The attacks are only launched on
our testing devices after certain sequences of secret buttons have been pressed in
the applications. However, note that in the application codes, such triggers are just
“if-else” statements. Thus, if the trigger conditions were replaced with an “if-true”
condition, these attacks could be launched on any user device with such applica-
tions. Therefore, the secret triggers used in our proof-of-concept applications do
not affect the conclusions drawn from our experiments.
Besides the seven attacks we have implemented, our attack vector can be used to
construct other attacks as long as there are security sensitive functions on iOS that
5The snapshot attack code is embedded into one of our applications which can keep running at
background utilizing audio playing feature. This application also passed Apples vetting process and
it sends out snapshots every 5 seconds once triggered.
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are not restricted by iOS sandbox. As each iOS version will include new function-
alities to the platform, each iOS update may introduce new attacks from malicious
third-party applications based on our attack vector.
2.4 Attack Mitigation
Our proof-of-concept attacks have shown that Apples current vetting and sandbox
mechanisms have weaknesses which can be exploited by third-party applications to
escalate their privileges and perform serious attacks on iOS users. In this section,
we first suggest improvements on the vetting process to mitigate the security threats
caused by dynamic invocations. We then propose enhancements on the iOS sandbox
to further defend against our attacks utilizing private APIs.
2.4.1 Improving Application Vetting Process
Static analysis can be used to determine all the API calls which are not invoked
with reflection (i.e., dynamic invocations), and it can provide the list of frameworks
that are statically linked in the application. Thus, an automated static analysis is
able to detect the standard way of invoking private APIs, as what is probably being
used by Apple in its current vetting process. In addition, we suggest to improve
the existing static analysis to detect suspicious applications based on certain code
signatures. For example, one suspicious code signature could be applications con-
taining any dlopen() or [NSBundle load] invocations whose parameters are
not constant strings (which match the cases of our attacks). However, as the static
analysis alone is not sufficient to determine whether a suspicious application is in-
deed a malware or not, manual examination and dynamic analysis should be utilized
to examine such suspicious applications.
In many cases, manual examination may not be able to find malicious behaviors
of the examined applications, because the malicious functions may not be preformed
for every execution. Instead, they can be designed in the way that such functions
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are only triggered when certain conditions have been satisfied. Examples of such
conditions include time triggers or button triggers (as what have been used in our
applications). When a malicious application uses such trigger strategy, the man-
ual inspection may not find any suspicious behaviors during the vetting process.
Such malicious applications can only be detected by utilizing fuzz testing [45] (or
in the extreme case, using symbolic execution [17]), where different inputs are used
to satisfy every condition of the application code. Furthermore, in order to deter-
mine whether sensitive user data are transferred out of the device, dynamic taint
analysis [48] is an effective approach to serve this purpose. However, since it is
expensive to apply fuzz testing and dynamic taint analysis on every application, the
vetting process may choose to run such examinations only on selected suspicious
applications.
2.4.2 Enhancement on iOS Sandbox
Dynamic Parameter Inspection. From the perspective of iOS sandbox, a straight-
forward defense to our attacks that utilize the dynamic loading functions (such as
[NSBundle load] and dlopen()) is to forbid third-party applications to in-
voke these functions. However, it is not practical to completely forbid the invo-
cation of dynamic loading functions, since frameworks, libraries and many other
resources need to be dynamically loaded for benign purposes at runtime. Even Ap-
ples official code, including both framework code and application code (which is
automatically generated by Xcode), utilizes dynamic loading functions extensively
to load resources at runtime. On the other hand, since sensitive APIs can be hooked
by utilizing the application sandbox, the parameters of these APIs can be checked at
runtime. Thus, it is useful if Apples sandbox is modified in the way that the param-
eter values passed to dynamic loading functions are examined, and accessing files
under a specific folder is forbidden.
One way of implementing this approach is to forbid the third-party ap-
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plications to dynamically load any frameworks under “/System/Library/”
folder.However, a sophisticated attacker may be able to completely reverse engineer
a given framework binary, locate all the code regions in the binary that are needed
for launching his attack, and then copy only the needed code regions from the binary
and insert into his application code. In this way, he does not need to dynamically
load framework binaries in his malicious applications. Therefore, this parameter-
inspection approach is not able to completely defend against the proposed attacks,
though it can increase the complexity for the adversary to construct these attacks.
Privileged IPC Verification. Another technique of enhancing the sandbox
is to dynamically check the privilege of the identity which makes sensitive API
calls. For example, a third-party application should not have the privilege to invoke
MKBKeyBagChangeSystemSecret API,which is used in our PIN-cracking at-
tack. Such private APIs should only be invoked by processes or services with
the system privilege. However, directly restricting the access to private APIs may
not effectively prevent the attacks. By analyzing the implementation of several
private APIs (in assembly code), we find that the private APIs eventually use
inter-process communication (IPC) methods, which communicate with the sys-
tem service process, to complete the functionalities of the private APIs. For ex-
ample, MKBKeyBagChangeSystemSecret API uses perform command()
method to communicate with the system service (with service bundle id
= ‘‘com.apple.mobile.keybagd’’). This means that instead of invoking
private APIs, an application can also use such IPC method to directly send command
to the system service process to perform the same functionality.
In order to defend against such attacks, for each privileged system service, the
recipient of the command (which is the service process itself) needs to check the
sender of the command to verify whether the sender has the valid privilege to make
such IPC. To enable this IPC verification, the system service process needs to main-
tain a list of privileged IPC commands which are checked dynamically when an IPC
is received. Compared to the parameter-inspection approach, privileged IPC verifi-
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cation provides better defense against the PIN-cracking, call-blocking and snapshot-
taking attacks as the corresponding privileged functionalities should not be used by
any third-party applications. However, this approach alone is not sufficient to miti-
gate the other four attacks listed in Table 1. For these four attacks, the correspond-
ing functionalities should be provided to applications due to usability reasons, but at
the same time, it needs to be ensured that user interactions are involved when these
functionalities are performed.
Service Delegation Enhancement. On iOS 6, Apple starts using the XPC Ser-
vice, which allows processes to communicate with each other asynchronously so
that it can be used for privilege separation. Originally on iOS 5, the SMS and email
APIs are implemented as “View Controller” classes that are created and used within
a third-party application process. Therefore, applications can manipulate these view
controller classes to send out SMSes and emails programmatically without users in-
teraction. However, on iOS 6, the SMS and email functionalities are now delegated
to another system process utilizing XPC Service, which is completely out of the pro-
cess space of third-party applications. Thus, a third-party application on iOS 6 is no
longer able to send SMSes or emails programmatically without users interaction.
Although currently iOS 6 has not implemented the service delegation mecha-
nism for the Twitter service, the tweet-posting attack can be prevented using this
mechanism, as it follows exactly the same service model as SMS and email. The
secret-filming attack, however, cannot be easily mitigated using such service delega-
tion. Instead of using a unified user interface, iOS enables third-party applications
to create their own customized user interfaces for taking photos or videos. If the
same service delegation mechanism is applied, then the camera interface will be
identical across different applications as it is provided by system service. Thus,
more precisely, service delegation is able to defend against camera device abuse,
but its implementation may greatly impact user experience.
System Notifiers for Sensitive Functionalities. In order to mitigate the threat
of secret filming, while preserving the functionality and flexibility of using camera
28
in third-party applications on iOS, one possible solution is to add a half-transparent
system notifier on the screen (e.g., at the upper-right corner), whenever the camera
device is being used. This notifier can be shown using the XPC mechanism so that
the notifier is handled by a system daemon process, which is outside of the control
of third-party applications. In this way, whenever the camera is being used (either
taking photos or taking videos), the system notifier is shown on the screen to alert
the user.
By enhancing the current iOS platform with the 1) privileged IPC verification, 2)
comprehensive service delegation, and 3) extended system notifiers, it will be able
to defend against all the seven attacks we construct. Note that since iOS is a close-
source platform, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) for us to implement these
mitigation methods we proposed, and thus it is one of the limitations in our work.
However, we have shared all our mitigation suggestions with Apple so that Apples
product security team may choose some of these methods to fix the sandbox. From
the partial knowledge that is revealed by our attacks and the mitigation analysis,
it may be inferred that the current iOS sandbox implementation is quite complex
and its privilege check is not complete. Due to its complexity and also its trade-off
nature against usability, it may not be easy to completely fix the iOS sandbox to
prevent future attacks.
2.5 Discussions
On the current iOS platform, when an application plays an audio file (e.g.,.mp3),
normally a music-playing notifier (i.e. the I symbol) is shown in the sta-
tus bar on top of the screen. However, this only happens when the applica-
tion is implemented following the standard programming rules, which require
the application code to call [[UIApplication sharedApplication]
beginReceivingRemote-ControlEvents]. This API call registers the ap-
plication in the system service so as to receive remote events, such as when a user
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presses the control buttons on earphone. In the background running application we
implement, however, this API is not invoked and our application simply calls the
basic audio playing APIs to play a silent music in an infinite loop. As a result,
no notifier is shown on the status bar when our application is running at the back-
ground, thus the iOS user may be totally unaware of the existence of this security
threat. In addition to playing audio, there are other means of enabling background
running, such as VOIP and tracking locations. Thus, besides the system notifier for
the camera functionality (Section 4.2), we suggest to add another system notifier
specifically designed to indicate that an application is running at the background.
Upon seeing this notifier, a user can force close any background applications that
are not being used. This will not only enhance security but also save device battery.
The PIN-cracking attack code introduced in Section 3.2 not only can be used
to steal device PIN and send it to an external server, but can also be used to reset
the current PIN to another value so that the legitimate user is not able to unlock
the device. In iOS settings, there is an option to “erase all data on this device after
10 failed passcode attempts”. If this option is enabled on a device and our PIN-
cracking code resets the PIN, it could make a user panic if he is unable to unlock
the device after several trials of inputting his original password. Again note that our
PIN-cracking attack itself will not trigger the “wrong password” event on the iOS
device and thus, there is no limit on the number of brute forcing trials for our attack
code when cracking the device PIN.
With the attack codes we shared with Apples product security team, the PIN-
cracking vulnerability has been fixed in the newly released iOS 6.1 (January 2013).
However, other security issues we discovered are still in the process of being ad-
dressed. Note that the conclusions about the vetting process and sandbox given in
this work are inferences based on observations from our experiments, as the details
of the vetting process and sandbox are kept as blackbox by Apple. The ground truth
may become available to the public when Apple decides to turn major components
of iOS into open source in the future, as what has been done for Mac OS X [5].
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2.6 Related Work
Spyphone [66] is a prototype application, developed for iOS 3.1.2, which illustrates
that a wide list of user data can be accessed on iOS by third-party applications.
However, Spyphone does not use any private APIs it only invokes public APIs and
reads public files to access user data in order to enable itself to appear in iTunes
Store, which is completely different from our malicious applications implemented.
In addition, the security enforcement of iOS has been significantly improved since
then so that a large portion of user data that can be accessed by Spyphone on iOS 3
is forbidden to access since iOS 5.
Malwares, such as iKee [62] and Dutch 5 ransom [63] worms, have been found
on iOS. However, these worms only work on jailbroken iOS devices where an SSH
server is installed with the default root password unchanged. Other iOS malwares
known to the public, such as iSAM created by Damopoulos et al. [18] (which fo-
cuses more on malware propagation methods), also exploit vulnerabilities exist only
on jailbroken iOS devices, which are different from our work.
Felt et al. [29] conduct a survey on the modern mobile malware in the wild,
which encompasses all known iOS, Symbian, and Android malwares that spread
between January 2009 and June 2011. They find that (i) all the 4 iOS malwares they
identified work only on jailbroken iOS devices, and none were listed in the iTunes
App Store; and (ii) only graywares are found on iTunes App Store which are then
removed by Apple. These findings are confirmed by Egele et al. [24], in which they
develop a static analysis tool, PiOS, to detect privacy leakages in iOS applications.
They perform static analysis on more than one thousand third-party iOS applications
and find out that only a few applications are graywares which stealthily access user
data without users awareness.
Extensive researches have been conducted on the other popular mobile platform
Android. Privilege escalation attacks on Android are proposed by [31], and the
defense mechanisms for such attacks are introduced by Bugiel et al. [105]. Enck et
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al. [26] performs static analysis of Android applications using the decompiler they
developed. Dynamic taint analysis on third-party Android applications is performed
by TaintDroid [25]. Comprehensive surveys on mobile security are provided by
Becher et al. [10] and Egners et al. [2].
The closest work to our research is the work by Miller [77]. By exploiting
the security flaw he found, he managed to get iOS devices to run unsigned codes
which are dynamically downloaded by his proof-of-concept malicious application.
Millers attack mechanism provides an alternative for the first stage of our proposed
attack vector. However, Apple has removed his application from the iTunes App
Store and released a fix for the security flaw. Thus, our dynamic invocation used
in the first stage, to our best knowledge, is the only way of bypassing the vetting
process. Although our mechanism is not complex, it is a very effective way of al-
lowing malicious applications appear in the official application store. Furthermore,
by performing sophisticated analysis on all existing iOS frameworks, we identify
seven sets of sensitive APIs which are not restricted by iOS sandbox and thus can
be utilized by any malicious applications.
2.7 Conclusion
The original goal of this work is to answer a simple (but not easy) research question:
is there a generic attack vector which enables third-party applications to launch
attacks on non-jailbroken iOS devices? Two pre-conditions need to be satisfied
in answering this question: (i) the third-party application has to pass the vetting
process and appear on the official application store; and (ii) the corresponding attack
codes must break through the restrictions of iOS sandbox in order to work on non-
jailbroken iOS devices.
In this chapter, we constructed effective mechanisms which allow any third-
party application to invoke private APIs without being detected by the vetting pro-
cess. By utilizing such mechanisms and exploiting the vulnerabilities in the appli-
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cation sandbox, we implemented seven proof-of-concept attacks which can cause
serious damages to iOS users. Finally, we suggested mitigation mechanisms to en-
hance the current vetting process and iOS sandbox. Our work fills the gap in the
current mobile security literature where most research efforts are conducted on An-
droid platform. We have shared all our findings with Apple’s product security team.
In January 2013, Apple released iOS 6.1 and fixed the PIN-cracking vulnerability
we discovered in iOS 6.0, while other security issues presented in this chapter still
remain unsolved.
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Chapter 3
Attacking Android Smartphone
Systems without Permissions
3.1 Introduction
Android adopts a permission system to protect users’ security and privacy. To access
resources that are out of application’s sandbox, an application needs to request for
permissions from users. In recent years, it has been reported that the Android per-
mission system suffers from several flaws. For instance, unprivileged applications
may leverage privileged applications to perform privileged tasks due to privilege es-
calation attacks [19] [12]. Several applications may collude to launch attacks with
combined permissions from all of the applications [30] [76]. However, no rigor-
ous study has been made on what potential attacks an application can launch on
Android smartphone systems without requesting for any permissions. Therefore,
in this work, we question the coverage of the current protection mechanisms and
investigate to what extent critical resources are exposed to malicious applications
via APIs without any protection mechanisms. There are two steps in our study. In
the first step, we analyze unprotected Application Programming Interfaces (APIs),
which allow third-party applications without any permissions to interact with mo-
bile system resources, such as GPS and camera, or to access users’ personal infor-
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mation. In the second step, we demonstrate a number of attacks that can be easily
launched by leveraging on the unprotected APIs obtained in the first step.
To retrieve unprotected APIs from Android framework, we perform the follow-
ing source-code static analysis: (1) inter-procedural call graph analysis on system
services for the discovery of all Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL)
interfaces that are not protected by any permission checking or Linux ID check-
ing mechanisms, (2) component analysis on system applications for identifying
the exposed and unprotected broadcast receivers, activities and services, and (3)
intra-procedural data-flow analysis for locating unprotected dynamically registered
broadcasts in both system services and system applications. We apply our analysis
on Android Open Source Project (AOSP) versions 5.1.0 r1 and 4.4.0 r1. On AOSP
version 5.1.0 r1, we identify 735 unprotected APIs in system services. In system
applications, we discover 612 unprotected components, where 156 are unprotected
broadcast receivers, 423 are unprotected activities and 33 are unprotected services.
Moreover, we discover 206 unprotected dynamically registered broadcasts, where
50 exist in system services and 156 exist in system applications. It is alarming that a
high number of unprotected APIs is discovered in different parts of Android frame-
works. We also compare our analysis results on versions 5.1.0 r1 and 4.4.0 r1. We
discover that the number of unprotected APIs increases on the newer version due to
the newly added functionalities. This is contrary to the common belief that the se-
curity of a new version should improve, since many security flaws in an old version
are reported and fixed.
After obtaining unprotected APIs, we create an adversary third-party application
without any permissions, which launches Java reflection attacks, broadcast injec-
tion attacks, broadcast hijacking attacks, malicious activity launch attacks, activity
hijacking attacks, malicious service launch attacks, and service hijacking attacks.
We discover that on Android version 4.4.0 r1, an attacker can block the synchro-
nization of emails, calendar events, browser bookmarks, browsing history, browser
extension, Google documents, and Google notes. In addition, an attacker can send
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notifications, set car mode, set night mode, wake up the device at certain time, and
set screen-off time. We reported our attacks on AOSP version 4.4.1 r1 to Google
and some of the reported vulnerabilities are fixed on version 5.0.0 r1. Nonetheless,
we still discovered more attacks on version 5.1.0 r1, which are also subsequently
reported and fixed on version 5.1.1 r35 and version 6.0. This shows that while the
platform providers make their effort in improving the security of Android frame-
work, they need a powerful tool to win the “arms race”.
On version 5.1.0 r1, we discover that an attacker can obtain country, Wi-Fi in-
formation, subscriber information, tether state, airplane mode, NFC state, GSM/
CDMA strength, location mode, USB state, power state and security setting for
lock screens. Moreover, some resources, such as device ID and SIM card state,
which should be accessed by permission-granted applications only, are accidentally
made available to all applications via unprotected APIs. An attacker can arbitrarily
set the volumes of Android phones and play users’ incoming call ringtones, alarms,
and notification sounds. An attacker can block Bluetooth discovery services, and
launch camera, mail, music and phone system applications even when the targeted
devices are locked. An attacker can also hijack various activities of system applica-
tions, including the interfaces for setting VPN (Virtual Private Network), Bluetooth
and Wi-Fi, as well as the interfaces for adding device administrators and user ac-
counts. These attacks show that the negligence in designing API-level permission
enforcement causes various threats to users’ security and privacy. We suggest plat-
form providers to systematically analyze unprotected APIs before releasing new
versions, so that similar attacks are prevented in the future.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we define our
adversary model. In Section 3.3, we describe how we retrieve unprotected APIs. In
Section 3.4, we show a set of proof-of-concept attacks on AOSP version 5.1.0 r1.
In Section 3.5, we compare our results with AOSP version 5.1.0 r1. In Section 3.6,
we provide some discussions on our research. In Section 3.7, we summarize the
related work. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 4.7.
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3.2 Adversary Model
Our adversary is a third-party application without any privileges or permissions,
which launches malicious operations using unprotected Android APIs. We refer
to it as “an attacker” in this work. We classify Android APIs into three cate-
gories: (1) normal APIs supported by system services, (2) loosely-coupled APIs
supported by system applications, and (3) dynamically registered broadcasts in both
system services and system applications. In the first category, API calls from ap-
plications are handled by system services, which provide main client-server inter-
faces between system-level processes and third-party application processes. For in-
stance, to exercise a complete control over cameras, such as changing the zoom and
flash light settings, an application may access com.hardware.camera2 API,
which in turn communicates with the system service, android.hardware.
ICameraService. In the second category, loosely-coupled APIs are supported
by system applications, which provide easy access to mobile phone functions. For
instance, to take a photo or a video, an application may call the system application
Camera using intents. Unlike normal APIs and loosely-coupled APIs, dynamically
registered broadcasts in the third category are undocumented APIs. They are mainly
used for internal communications among system services and system applications.
All these types of APIs can be abused by an attacker when they are not properly
protected.
3.2.1 System Services
Third-party applications access APIs of system services by calling the method
getSystemService(name) of the Context class. The parameter name rep-
resents the name of the required system service. The returned object is then casted
into the Manager class. For example, AlarmManager object can be retrieved
by invoking the method with parameter “alarm”. However, security checks per-
formed inside the Manager class can be easily bypassed [27]. Moreover, APIs
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listed inside the Manager class are not complete; third-party applications can
use Java reflection to invoke private APIs, which are marked with “@hide” an-
notations. Thus, we assume that an attacker may use Java reflection to inter-
act with all unprotected APIs, including public and private APIs. Using Java re-
flection, an attacker invokes the getService(name) method inside the hidden
ServiceManager class. Even though ServiceManager is a hidden class, it
is unlikely to change, as the android.jar library relies on it to support normal
APIs. The getService(name) method returns an IBinder object, which can
be used to invoke any exposed methods inside the corresponding system services.
Listing 1 shows an example attack on AOSP version 4.4.4 r1. In this example,
an attacker attempts to set the maximum screen-off time on mobile devices.
There is no publicly available API for such function inside the PowerManager
class, which is responsible for managing the power state of Android devices.
However, IPowerManager, a hidden Stub class used by PowerManager,
provides such method. To obtain an IBinder instance of IPowerManager,
an attacker may first call ServiceManager.getService("power")
method using Java reflection. After that, it invokes the
setMaximumScreenOffTimeoutFromDeviceAdmin() method of
IPowerManager, which in turn calls similar functions inside
PowerManagerService. In this way, the attacker gains access to the system
service running in privileged process. Since we set the screen-off time to 0, mobile
users have no idea why their phone screens keep fading out. This unprotected API
is originally intended for internal use, as PowerManagerService states in its
comment, “Used by device administration to set the maximum screen off timeout.
This method must only be called by the device administration policy manager.”
However, no security checking is performed inside PowerManagerService,
which makes it vulnerable to malicious third-party applications.
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Listing 1 An Example Attack using an Unprotected API from a System Service
1 //Invoke ServiceManager.getService("power") method and obtain
IBinder object of PowerManagerService↪→
2
3 Class serviceManagerClass =
Class.forName("android.os.ServiceManager");↪→
4 Method getServiceMethod =
serviceManagerClass.getDeclaredMethod("getService",
String.class);
↪→
↪→
5 IBinder iBinder = (IBinder) getServiceMethod.invoke(null,
"power");↪→
6
7 //Get Stub object of IPowerManager by passing IBinder object to
asInterface() method↪→
8
9 Class stubClass = Class.forName("android.os.IPowerManager$Stub");
10 Method asInterfaceMethod = stubClass.getMethod("asInterface", new
Class[]{IBinder.class});↪→
11 Object IPowerManagerObj = asInterfaceMethod.invoke(null,
iBinder);↪→
12
13 //Invoke
IPowerManager.setMaximumScreenOffTimeoutFromDeviceAdmin(0)
method using Java reflection
↪→
↪→
14
15 Class IPowerManagerClass =
Class.forName("android.os.IPowerManager");↪→
16 Method setScreenOffTimeoutMethod =
IPowerManagerClass.getDeclaredMethod
("setMaximumScreenOffTimeoutFromDeviceAdmin", Integer.TYPE);
↪→
↪→
17 System.out.print(setScreenOffTimeoutMethod.invoke(IPowerManagerObj,
0));↪→
3.2.2 System Applications
System applications provide loosely coupled APIs by exposing their compo-
nents in the applications’ AndroidManifest.xml files. In each XML file,
<application> is the parent element, which contains some sub-elements
for the application’s components, such as <service>, <activity>, and
<receiver>. Several tags and attributes are used to protect the components
of system applications from other applications. They include intent-filter,
exported, permission and enabled. Each exported and enabled component
without any permission protection represents an unprotected API. We consider the
following types of attacks.
• Broadcast Theft: An attacker may eavesdrop normal broadcast intents. This
39
may result in certain user information being stolen by the attacker.
• Malicious Broadcast Injection: An attacker may send broadcasts and trigger
broadcast receivers of system applications. This may result in unintended
actions being performed by the attacker.
• Activity Hijacking: An attacker may launch its own activities when system
activities are invoked. This may result in phishing attacks, where users mis-
take malicious interfaces as system interfaces.
• Malicious Activity Launch: An attacker may secretly launch activities from
system applications if the activities are not well-protected. This may result in
changing the state of certain system applications or tricking users.
• Service Hijacking: An attacker may intercept the intents sent to legitimate
services of system applications. The attacker may provide false responses to
the calling applications.
• Malicious Service Launch: An attacker may launch any unprotected ser-
vices of system applications. The damage of this attack depends on the func-
tionality of the unprotected services.
Our work is the first to consider these types of attacks on AOSP system appli-
cations and analyze them as a part of Android framework, although they have been
applied on third-party applications and vendor-customized system applications by
Chin et. al. [15] and Wu et al. [87] respectively. Note that we consider broadcast
receivers of system applications or both broadcast theft and malicious broadcast
injection attacks, so that we can discover as many attacks as possible on AOSP
framework.
In addition to intent-filter, exported, permission and enabled
tags and attributes used in AndroidManifest.xml files, the concept
of protected broadcasts is used for limiting broadcast injection. Pro-
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tected broadcasts are broadcasts that can only be sent by applications run-
ning in system-level processes. Protected broadcasts are defined in the
AndroidManifest.xml file of AOSP root source code. For exam-
ple, if the file includes the <protected-broadcast android:name =
"android.intent.action.PACKAGE INSTALL"/> tag, Android system
allows no applications except system-level applications to send broadcasts with the
action string, android.intent.action.PACKAGE INSTALL. Thus, when
launching broadcast injection attacks, we exclude these protected broadcasts from
a list of our discovered broadcasts.
3.2.3 Dynamically Registered Broadcasts
Both system services and system applications may regis-
ter broadcast receivers dynamically using APIs, such as
registerReceiver(BroadcastReceiver,IntentFilter) or send
broadcasts using APIs, such as sendBroadcast(Intent). For simplicity,
we refer to these types of broadcast receivers and broadcasts as “dynamically
registered broadcasts” or simply “broadcasts” under related sections. Using them,
an attacker may launch broadcast theft and broadcast injection attacks.
3.3 Retrieving Unprotected APIs
Retrieving unprotected APIs is not trivial due to a wide variety of API types, vast
presence of APIs in Android framework and different protection mechanisms en-
forced. In this section, we apply three types of analysis for retrieving unprotected
APIs: (1) call graph analysis on APIs provided by system services, (2) compo-
nent analysis on APIs supported by system applications ,and (3) data flow analysis
on dynamically registered broadcasts. The result of our analysis provides a broad
overview of unprotected APIs in Android framework. Our analysis is first applied
to AOSP version 5.1.0 r1 with API level 22 (Lollipop). We perform call graph anal-
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ysis and data flow analysis based on Soot [50] version 2.5, which is an existing Java
source code analysis tool. We also develop our own tool written in Python for scan-
ning and identifying necessary source code files, and for analyzing components of
system applications. We use an LG Nexus 5 for testing.
3.3.1 Call Graph Analysis on System Services
Using Android Debug Bridge (ADB) command, we discover 97 system services in
Android 5.1.0 r1 version, where 11 of them are listed without any interface names.
These 11 system services are designed to communicate with other system-level pro-
cesses only. We identify all the unprotected APIs of system services using call graph
analysis. A call graph is a directed graph, where each node represents a method and
each edge indicates the invocation of one method to another. Our call graph analysis
involves three steps: (1) finding all available APIs from a system service, (2) find-
ing all security checking methods protecting the APIs, and (3) finding whether there
exists at least one method call chain from an exposed API to any security checking
method.
Step 1: Finding Source Methods - The source methods are the public methods
of system services that are exposed via AIDL interfaces. We apply Soot to load a
list of system service classes, and loop through all their public methods. In this way,
we discover 1,751 APIs that are exposed to third-party applications.
Step 2: Finding Sink Methods - The sink methods are the methods that perform
security checks. In this work, we consider permission and Linux ID checking mech-
anisms of system services. Some methods in Andriod framework are dedicated for
permission checking [3], and we identify 35 of them, including 18 methods from
the ContextImpl class, 2 methods from the ActivityManager class and 15
methods from the PackageManagerService class.
There is no specific method dedicated for Linux ID checking. System services
normally perform the following steps for Linux ID checking. First, they obtain
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the UID or PID of the calling application or process using getCallingPid()
and getCallingUid() methods from the Binder class. After that, they per-
form conditional check, such as “callingUid != Process.SYSTEM UID”,
where SYSTEM UID represents 1000. To locate ID checking methods, we first iden-
tify whether a method calls getCallingPid() and getCallingUid(). We
then determine whether the returned variables are checked against any system-level
Linux IDs in any If statements in the following source code. Note that the UIDs
for system applications range from 0 to 9999. For instance, the UID for root user is
0, and the UID for telephony is 1001. The most commonly used UID is 1000, and
it is used for running system server codes with certain privileges. As long as there
exists at least one check against system-level IDs, we regard this method as a sink
method.
Step 3: Building Call Graph - A context-insensitive inter-procedural call graph
is built using Soot. The set of publicly accessible methods (i.e. source methods)
are marked as entry points of the call graphs. After building the call graph, we loop
through the method calls, and check if each source method ends up with any sink
methods. We then exclude the methods with any security checking. In this way, we
discover a list of methods that are not protected by any security mechanisms. Our
analysis discovers 735 unprotected APIs, which count for 41.98% of total public
APIs of system services. Our call graph analysis shows that a large number of An-
droid APIs are unprotected and accessible by any third-party applications without
any privileges.
3.3.2 Component Analysis on System Applications
We apply component analysis to retrieve unprotected components of system ap-
plications. There are altogether 69 system applications. We extract the compo-
nent information from the AndroidManifest.xml files of system applications.
We discover altogether 110 broadcast receiver components, 414 activity compo-
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Broadcast
Receivers
Activities Services
No of unprotected action strings 156 423 33
No of unique unprotected action strings 86 189 23
No of unprotected system applications 30 45 9
Table 3.1: Analysis Result of System Applications
nents and 140 service components from 69 system applications. A single system
application component may have multiple <intent-filter> tags with multi-
ple action strings. To discover unprotected action strings of system components,
we first analyze if the system applications implement any application-level permis-
sions. We then explore the components of system applications that satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions: (1) the components’ attributes contain intent-filter, (2)
permission is set to none, and (3) exported is set to none or true. In
our analysis, we do not consider the enabled attribute, since it can be changed
dynamically. Table 3.1 shows the result of our component analysis on system appli-
cations. Activities represent the most common type of unprotected action strings,
followed by broadcast receivers and services.
Unlike other components, broadcasts can be further protected by An-
droid system. Such broadcasts are called protected broadcasts, which
are defined with <protected - broadcast> tag. Only system-level
processes are allowed to send protected broadcasts. We obtain a list
of protected broadcasts from the manifest file located under directory
frameworks/base/core/res/AndroidManifest.xml. In total, we dis-
cover 225 protected broadcasts in the manifest file. Among the 86 broadcast action
strings exposed from system applications, 34 of them are protected system broad-
casts. Thus, an attacker may launch broadcast injection attacks with the remaining
52 broadcasts.
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3.3.3 Data Flow Analysis on Dynamically Registered Broadcasts
Both system services and system applications may register and send broadcasts dy-
namically. We first retrieve the source code files of system services and system
applications. After that, we apply data flow analysis to obtain the broadcast action
strings from the source code files.
Identifying Dynamically Registered Broadcasts
From the AIDL interfaces obtained from the ADB command, we retrieve the Java
files of system services. For instance, we find AlarmManagerService file from
IAlarmManager AIDL interface. To achieve this, we scan the entire framework,
and obtain Java files that (1) extend AIDL interfaces, (2) create new Stub classes
with AIDL interface names or (3) implement AIDL interfaces and later extend them.
These are the different ways by which system services implement their AIDL inter-
faces. In total, we discover 80 files of system services. The remaining services are
only exposed via native codes, and thus excluded from our analysis. Note that our
analysis does not include the classes called by the service class. A more complicated
analysis will be required if we want to include them, since we will have to determine
which methods are called from the service class. To obtain the source code of sys-
tem applications, we scan the AOSP source code directories, read in every Java file,
and look for package names of system applications. In total, we collect 1,392 source
code files for 69 system applications. From the identified source code files of system
services and system applications, we search for broadcast registering methods, such
as registerReceiver(BroadcastReceiver, IntentFilter), and
broadcast sending methods, such as sendBroadcast(Intent), of Context
class. We apply data flow analysis on these methods so as to obtain the action strings
of dynamically registered broadcasts.
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Data Flow Analysis
IntentFilter is a parameter of broadcast registering methods, and Intent is
a parameter of broadcast sending methods. Both IntentFilter and Intent
are defined using action strings. IntentFilter can be initialized with an ac-
tion string using new IntentFilter(String action) method, or it can
be initialized first using new IntentFilter() method and later defined using
the addAction(String action) method. We perform a backward data flow
analysis on these methods using Soot so as to identify the required action strings.
In total, we discover 130 unique broadcast action strings (238 instances) from sys-
tem services and 207 unique action strings (424 instances) from system applica-
tions. After that, we determine whether the retrieved action strings are protected.
By extracting protected broadcasts from our discovered broadcasts, we have 50 un-
protected broadcasts in system services and 156 unprotected broadcasts in system
applications, which can be abused by an attacker.
3.4 Attacking without Permissions
Our static analysis provides a list of unprotected APIs from system services, a list
of unprotected components from system applications, and a list of unprotected
dynamically registered broadcasts. We confirm the attacks by exploiting them
with a third-party application without any permissions. In particular, we show
that Java reflection attacks can be launched on APIs supported by system services
and that intent-based attacks can be launched by exploiting the APIs supported by
system applications and dynamically registered broadcasts. The attacks are per-
formed semi-automatically: many codes used in the attacks are generated auto-
matically, while parameters required for some attacks are identified manually. For
instance, we automatically generate the codes, such as sendBroadcast(new
Intent("actionString"));, where actionString is replaced by the
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real action strings discovered from our static analysis. Note that we aim not to
provide an exhaustive list of all possible attacks but to show how easily serious at-
tacks can be launched to Android smartphone systems without requesting for any
permissions.
3.4.1 System Services
We identify two main types of possible attacks via the unprotected APIs supported
by system services. An attacker may control various audio functions of mobile
devices and steal users’ information.
Audio Control
A system serivce, IAudioService, provides several unprotected APIs for con-
trolling the audio systems. Without requesting for any permissions, an attacker may
trigger call ringtones and alarms that users personally set for their phones. An at-
tacker may produce other special sound effects, such as notification, click, and key-
press sounds. To do so, an attacker first uses the getRingtonePlayer() API
to obtain an IRingtonePlayer object, and then invokes its play() method.
Moreover, an attacker may arbitrarily set the volumes of call ringtone, alarm, no-
tification, music, system and voice call sounds using the setStreamVolume()
API. An attacker abusing both unprotected APIs can be dangerous. For instance,
an attacker may set the devices to their highest volumes and start playing ringtone
or alarm sounds continuously. In such cases, even when devices are set to silent
mode, they start ringing, which may disturb users in various social situations, such
as in meetings. The only way for users to stop such attacks is to shut down their
phones. In similar attacks, an attacker may confuse users by playing notification
sounds without sending any notifications. Alternatively, an attacker may set the
volume to 0 so that users become unaware of any incoming calls or alarms.
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Leaked In-
formation
Description Exploited Method Exploited Class
Device ID Unique device ID, such as
IMEI for GSM and the MEID
or ESN for CDMA phones
getDeviceId() IPhoneSubInfo
SIM Card
State
Whether SIM card is ready,
absent or requires PIN to un-
lock
getSimStateFor
Subscriber()
iSub
Lock
Setting
Whether user sets password
or pattern lock
havePassword()
and havePattern()
ILockSettings
Call state Whether there is an incom-
ing call, established tele-
phony call, or established au-
dio/video chat or VoIP call
getMode() IAudioService
Ringtone
mode
Whether ringer mode is silent
and vibrate, silent and not vi-
brate or normal
getRingerMode
Internal()
IAudioService
Input
Device
External and internal input
devices, such as joystick or
keyboard type
getInputDevice() IInputManager
Country Current country of user detectCountry() ICountryDetector
Copied
data
Copied data from clip board addPrimaryClip
ChangedLis-
tener()
IClipboard
Table 3.2: Information Leakage From System Services
Information Leakage
An attacker may obtain information about user’s device ID, SIM card state, call
state, ringer mode, input devices, country and copied data from clipboard. The
unprotected APIs exploited for such attacks are shown in Table 3.2. Interest-
ingly, we discover that device ID and SIM card state are accidentally made
available via unprotected APIs, although they are supposed to be protected by
android.permission.READ PHONE STATE permission. An attacker, who
tracks such information continuously, can easily identify individual users and infer
users’ behaviours, which violates users’ privacy.
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3.4.2 System Applications
By exploiting unprotected APIs of system applications, an attacker may launch
the following attacks: broadcast theft, malicious broadcast injection, activity hi-
jacking, malicious activity launch, service hijacking, and malicious service launch.
Broadcast theft, activity hijacking, and service hijacking attacks occur when an at-
tacker intercepts intents by registering intent filters with unprotected action strings
in its AndroidManifest.xml file. Malicious broadcast injection, malicious ac-
tivity launch, and malicious service launch attacks occur when an attacker sends
intents with sendBroadcast(Intent), startActivity(Intent) and
startService(Intent) methods. Such intents are initialized with unpro-
tected action strings identified in the previous section. The intent theft attacks
normally result in information leakage and component hijacking, while the other
attacks result in unintended changes of Andriod system state.
Broadcast Theft
We discover that an attacker is able to obtain network, alarm, and account related
information by intercepting unprotected broadcast intents. From the broadcast with
action string android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY CHANGE, an attack may
obtain network name, network state (e.g. connected, disconnected, connecting),
network type (e.g. Wi-Fi or mobile LTE), and roaming status without requesting for
android.permission.ACCESS NETWORK STATE permission. An attacker
may receive android.app.action.NEXT ALARM CLOCK CHANGED
broadcast when a next alarm is set on the device. An attacker can also obtain
android.accounts.LOGIN ACCOUNTS CHANGED broadcast when user ac-
count information (e.g., Gmail, Facebook, Skype account) is changed. Although
some information leakage seems benign, it becomes serious when combined with
other information. For instance, by constantly retrieving device ID and network
name, an attacker may identify an individual user and determine the user’s home
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and work locations.
Malicious Broadcast Injection
Various attacks can be launched by sending broadcasts with unpro-
tected action strings. An interesting finding is that the action string
android.bluetooth.intent.DISCOVERABLE TIMEOUT is unpro-
tected. By continuously sending broadcasts with this action string, an attacker
can block other Bluetooth phones from discovering the exploited device. This
attack disables the scan mode of the device’s Bluetooth adapter and thus, makes
its Bluetooth service unusable. Another finding is that by exploiting the action
strings, android.btopp.intent.action.OPEN RECEIVED FILES
and android.intent.action.DOWNLOAD NOTIFICATION CLICKED,
an attacker may open the folders where the mobile user receives files from
Bluetooth transfer, and where the downloaded files exist. Finally, an attacker
may launch an input method chooser for different languages using action string
android.settings.SHOW INPUT METHOD PICKER.
Activity Hijacking
During activity hijacking, an attacker launches its own applications
when intents with unprotected action strings are triggered. From our
analysis, we discover that android.intent.action.DIAL and
android.media.action.STILL IMAGE CAMERA SECURE action
strings are not protected by any permissions. Thus, an attacker may hijack
phone and camera applications, when users launch them from their lock
screens. Another finding is that an attacker may hijack Bluetooth, Wi-Fi,
account (e.g. Gmail account), and Virtual Private Network (VPN) setting
pages, when they are launched from the Setting application. The exploited
action strings include android.settings.BLUETOOTH SETTINGS,
android.settings.WIFI SETTINGS, android.settings.ADD
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ACCOUNT SETTINGS, and android.net.vpn.SETTINGS. However, to
trick users completely, the attacker have to implement full functionalities, which
may requires permissions. Moreover, activity hijacking is hindered by the applica-
tion chooser, which is launched, when there are conflicting applications handling
the same intent. It is thus difficult for an attacker to launch these attacks without
being noticed.
Malicious Activity Launch
Leaked
Informa-
tion
Description Exploited Broadcast Action String
Network
and Wi-Fi
NetworkInfo object -
network name, network state
(e.g. Connected, discon-
nected, connecting), network
type (e.g. Wi-Fi or mobile
LTE)
WifiInfo object- SSID,
BSSID, MAC address, link
speed, frequency
LinkProperties object
- Interface name, link ad-
dress, routes, DNS address,
domains
android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY
CHANGE
android.net.wifi.STATE CHANGE
android.net.wifi.WIFI STATE
CHANGED
Tether
State
Which portable Wi-Fi hotspot
is on and available
android.net.conn.TETHER STATE
CHANGED
Airplane
Mode
Whether airplane mode is on
or off
android.intent.action.AIRPLANE
MODE
NFC State Whether NFC is on or off android.nfc.action.ADAPTER STAT
E CHANGED
SIM Card
State
Whether SIM card state, such
as ready or absent, changes
android.intent.action.SIM STATE
CHANGED
Phone
Service
State
Whether phone is in service,
out of service, emergency
only or power off
android.intent.action.SERVICE
STATE
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Subscription
State
Whether data, SMS or voice
subscription changes
android.intent.action.ACTION DEFA
ULT SUBSCRIPTION CHANGED
android.intent.action.ACTION DEFA
ULT DATA SUBSCRIPTION CHA
NGED
android.intent.action.ACTION DEFA
ULT SMS SUBSCRIPTION CHA
NGED
android.intent.action.ACTION DEFA
ULT VOICE SUBSCRIPTION CHA
NGED
GSM/CDMA
Strength
Various measurements in-
cluding LteRsrp, LteRssbr,
LteCqi, CdmaDbm, CdmaE-
cio, GsmSignalStrength,
EvdoDbm, EvdoSnr, EvdoE-
cio, GsmBitErrorRate
android.intent.action.SIG STR
Location
Mode
Whether location mode, such
as high accuracy (use GPS,
Wi-Fi, cellular network to
determine location), battery
saving (use Wi-Fi and cellu-
lar network to determine lo-
cation) or device only (Use
GPS to determine location),
changes
android.location.MODE CHANGED
android.location.PROVIDERS
CHANGED
Volume Volum value and whether
phone is muted
android.media.VOLUME CHANGE
D ACTION
android.media.RINGER MODE
CHANGED
android.media.STREAM MUTE
CHANGED ACTION
USB State Whether USB is connected,
in ADB mode or configured
android.hardware.usb.action.USB
STATE
Power
State
Whether power is connected
or disconnected
android.intent.action.ACTION
POWER CONNECTED
android.intent.action.ACTION
POWER DISCONNECTED
Table 3.3: Information Leakage From Dynamically Regis-
tered Broadcasts
We discover that an attacker may launch several unprotected activities from system
applications. Since some activities are entry points of system applications, this
attack leads to the launching of the corresponding applications. An attacker may
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launch lock screen, emergency dialer, camera, mail, and music applications in such
attacks. Some attacks, such as launching lock screen and emergency dialer, may
confuse users, while other attacks, such as launching camera, may drain device
batteries. In the following, we provide more details about such attacks for different
system applications.
Warnings: An attacker may launch activities for the following warning mes-
sages: “Network monitoring: A third party is capable of monitoring your network
activity, including emails, apps, and secure websites. A trusted credential installed
on your device is making this possible.”, “‘Attention. You need to set a lock screen
PIN or password before you can use credential storage,” “Attention. Remove all
contents? Cancel or Ok,” “Oops! This device is already set up,” and “To improve
location accuracy and for other purposes, null wants to turn on network scanning,
even when Wi-Fi is off. All this for all apps that want to scan? Deny or Allow.” A
severe consequence of these attacks is that user’s selection from the warning mes-
sages takes real effect on the state of the phone.
Setting UIs: 67 activities of the system setting application are exposed to third-
party applications in our findings. These activities include setting User Interfaces
(UIs) for security (lock screen, encryption, credential storage and device adminis-
tration), privacy (factory reset, restore and backup), developer options, Bluetooth,
Near Field Communication (NFC) payment, Wi-Fi, location, sound, USB, and sys-
tem notification. An attacker may launch these interfaces at any time without re-
questing for any permissions.
Others: Several hidden features can be launched using unprotected action
strings. An example is the colour correction setting. When this activity is launched,
the exploited interface states that this colour correction feature is experimental and
may affect the performance of phones. Another attack is to launch the mobile emer-
gency alert setting page, which lists the threats to life and property (e.g., robbery)
around the area. Other unprotected activities includes the Wi-Fi network choosing
interface, the brightness setting interface, the wallpaper setting interface, the live
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wallpaper choosing interface, and the downloaded file interface.
Service Hijacking
From Android 5.0 and above, only explicit intents with clearly stated package names
can be used for binding services. Consequently, an attacker cannot launch any ser-
vice hijacking attacks by simply declaring similar services with the same action
strings as those of system applications’ services.
Malicious Service Launch
There are two steps involved in launching the malicious service launch. An attacker
first binds the services exposed from system applications and then invokes the meth-
ods inside. We discover that an attacker can successfully bind 15 services of system
applications, including 14 services from Bluetooth system applications and one me-
dia service. An attacker may search for the class names of the exposed services in
AndroidManifest.xml files of system applications, and use their class names
for binding with explicit intents. After binding, however, an attacker cannot invoke
any exposed methods from these services, because these methods are well-protected
inside the source code of services. For instance, the methods from the Bluetooth
system application are protected by the android.permission.BLUETOOTH
and android.permission.BLUETOOTH ADMIN permissions. Therefore, an
attacker cannot launch any useful attacks by simply invoking these exposed meth-
ods.
3.4.3 Dynamically Registered Broadcasts
We show that several broadcast theft and malicious broadcast injection attacks can
be launched by exploiting unprotected dynamically registered broadcasts.
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Broadcast Theft
Similar to the broadcast theft attacks to system applications, an attacker may steal
user information from unprotected dynamically registered broadcasts. We discover
that an attacker is able to obtain network and Wi-Fi information, tether state, air-
plane mode, NFC state, SIM card state, phone service state, subscription state,
GSM/CDMA strength, location mode, volume, USB state, and power state. A
detailed description about the information leakage due to broadcast theft is given
in Table 3.3. Although some of the leaked information seems benign, much use-
ful information can be inferred from it. For example, location information can
be inferred from Wi-Fi data and GSM/CDMA strength [64]. Users’ payment and
travel behaviours may be inferred from NFC state and airplane mode. Users’ sleep-
ing patterns can be inferred from USB state and power state [41]. We discover
that some information is available to an attack application without any permis-
sions, even though it is stated in Android API documentation that such informa-
tion must be protected by permissions. For instance, according to Android API
documentation, network and Wi-Fi information should be protected by permis-
sion android.permission.ACCESS NETWORK STATE; the SIM card state,
phone state, and GSM/CDMS signal strength information should be protected by
permission android.permission.READ PHONE STATE. This shows that dy-
namically registered broadcasts leak a lot of information to third-party applications,
and platform providers should take additional steps to protect these broadcasts.
Malicious Broadcast Injection
An attacker may broadcast false information via malicious broadcast injections. We
discover that intended receivers of these unprotected broadcasts are third-party ap-
plications or vendor-customized system applications. However, they are excluded
from our study, as we focus only on Android framework as the attack target. Thus,
although we have confirmed that an attacker can send these broadcasts, further anal-
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ysis is required to study the impact of the attacks to third-party applications and
vendor-customized system applications.
We discover that an attacker may send false commands for mu-
sic applications, such as “next”, “pause”, “previous”, and “tog-
gle pause”. The exploited action strings in this attack in-
clude com.android.music.musicservicecommand.next,
com.android.music.musicservicecommand.pause,
com.android.music.musicservicecommand.previous, and
com.android.music.musicservicecommand.togglepause.
Moreover, an attacker may send malicious information about the status of cur-
rently running music, such as its metadata, play state, and queue state. The
exploited action strings include com.android.music.metachanged,
com.android.music.playstatechanged, and
com.android.music.queuechanged broadcasts. We also discover that
an attacker may send broadcast android.security.STORAGE CHANGED.
This broadcast is triggered when (i) a new Certificate Authority (CA) is added,
(ii) an existing CA is removed or disabled, (iii) a disabled CA is enabled, or
(iv) the trusted storage is reset. This attack may cause serious problems to the
receiving applications that act according to the received broadcasts. Moreover, an
attacker may maliciously broadcast user log-in account, NFC state, data connec-
tion state, and emergency callback mode changes. The exploited action strings
in these cases are android.accounts.LOGIN ACCOUNTS CHANGED,
android.nfc.action.ADAPTER STATE CHANGED,
android.intent.action.PRECISE DATA CONNECTION STATE CHANGED
and android.intent.action.EMERGENCY CALLBACK MODE CHANGED.
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3.5 Attacking a Different Version
We apply our study to AOSP version 4.4.4 r1, and compare to what we have discov-
ered on AOSP version 5.1.0 r1. We discover the differences in terms of unprotected
APIs and viable attacks on these two versions. The attacks on version 4.4.4 r1 have
been reported to the Google’s security team, and most of them have been mitigated
in version 5.1.0 r1. Even so, we still discover more unprotected APIs and new at-
tacks in version 5.1.0 r1, which have also been reported to Google. This implies
that the ad-hoc effort in mitigating the reported attacks is not sufficient, and system-
atic analysis would be helpful for platform developers to analyze unprotected APIs
and improve the security of new AOSP versions.
3.5.1 Retrieving Unprotected APIs
We discover 79 system services and 69 system applications on AOSP version
4.4.4 r1. Compared to AOSP version 5.1.0 r1, we have 10 less system services,
and the same number of system applications. Some system services, such as the fin-
gerprint service and the web-view update service are not included in AOSP 4.4.4 r1.
Our analysis reveals 557 unprotected APIs from AIDL interfaces of system services,
which count for 34.77% of all 1,602 public methods on AOSP version 4.4.4 r1.
There are 88 unprotected unique broadcast action strings (150 instances), 165 un-
protected activity action strings (394 instances) and 18 unprotected service action
strings (30 instances) from system applications in our results. It is also discovered
that 47 out of total 114 dynamically registered broadcasts in the source code of sys-
tem services are unprotected, and 124 out of 171 dynamically registered broadcasts
in source code of system applications are unprotected. Compared to AOSP 5.1.0 r1,
the number of unprotected APIs is smaller. This result is alarming, since it indicates
that more unprotected APIs are introduced to the framework as new APIs are added
in the later version.
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3.5.2 Attacking without Permissions
Our attacks on AOSP previous version 4.4.4 r1 can be summarized as follows.
Denial-of-Service Attacks
By exploiting a single unprotected API, Content.cancel Sync(), an attacker
may launch denial of service attacks on the synchronization of all content providers.
This synchronization API is used for transferring data between an Android device
and web servers. We discover that on Nexus 5, an attacker may block the syn-
chronization of Gmail, Google Calendar, Google Drive, Google Note, Chrome and
etc. By doing so, the attacker can prevent users from receiving new emails, even
when users manually click on “refresh” in email apps. An attacker may also pre-
vent synchronizing new calendar events with users’ desktop computers, receiving
newly shared google drive documents, and synchronizing Google notes, synchroniz-
ing Chrome’s bookmarks, history, tabs, passwords, extensions and many browser-
related information. Moreover, we discover that other popular applications, includ-
ing Dropbox, Twitter, Facebook, Skype and Mozilla Firefox, also use the synchro-
nization API Content.cancel Sync(). For instance, Skype uses the API for
synchronizing contact information, while Firefox uses it for synchronizing book-
marks, history, tab and password information. Thus, their synchronization functions
can be deferred by an attacker.
Other Attacks
An attacker may send notifications to users, set car mode (which is used to open
speaker directly from calls), set night mode (which allows the OS to intelligently
change the color theme depending on the time of day), wake up the device at certain
time (without the wake-lock permission), and set the screen-off time. Moreover, an
attacker may obtain a variety of valuable information from users’ devices, including
what password salts are used, whether users set security for lock screen, whether
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users use passwords, pins or pattern locks for log-in, whether the lock screen is on
or off, and whether the screen is turned on. Moreover, a false system notification
can be sent to show that devices have entered into the emergency callback mode.
3.6 Discussions
Our research reveals many attacks that can be launched by applications with no
permissions. This discovery is important, because a significant portion of Android
security research focuses on applications that have permissions, and no one has
looked into the unprotected resources, which are easily accessible without permis-
sions. Many of our attacks, after being reported twice for two versions, have been
acknowledged and fixed by the platform provider. This shows that our analysis
on unprotected APIs is necessary in improving the security of Android framework.
Note that we do not suggest to reclassify and protect all the corresponding resources
that are attacked in this work. The reason is that protecting all resources may de-
grade the usability of the framework. For example, usability researchers state that
too many permission requests may cause users to grant permissions without careful
considerations [28]. Therefore, while we highlight the security flaws of unprotected
APIs in this work, we believe that an optimal defense mechanism should consider
not only the security and privacy aspects but also the flexibility and usability aspects
of the framework. Coming up with an optimal solution for this problem is not trivial
and requires involvement from both research and industry communities. Thus, we
leave it as future work to find various ways of protecting the currently unprotected
resources without degrading other aspects of the framework. In the meantime, we
suggest platform providers to systematically analyze unprotected APIs before re-
leasing new versions, so that similar attacks are prevented in the future.
We identify three ways in which our analysis of Android APIs can be improved
and used as a commercial vulnerability analysis tool. First, our work focuses only
on detecting unprotected APIs and exploiting them for attacks. Thus, a natural
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step forward is to determine whether an unprotected API is indeed vulnerable by
analyzing the nature of the API source code. Second, platform providers may con-
sider analyzing other types of unprotected APIs, such as callback methods, listeners
and class fields. Callback methods and listeners provide alternative ways of inter-
process communication, and they may expose some vulnerabilities from Android
APIs. Third, platform providers may consider a more advanced adversary, which
possesses certain privileges or permissions. Such adversary may be categorized ac-
cording to its permission level, such as normal, dangerous, signature, and
signatureOrSystem, and/or according to the types of Linux users associated
to privileges, such as root, system, keystore, media, nobody, wifi, and
u0 a86. A more advanced adversary would lead to more serious attacks.
3.7 Related Work
The mapping between API calls and permission checks on Android has been inves-
tigated in prior research, including Stowaway by Felt et al. [27], COPES by Bartel
et al. [9] and PScout by Au et al. [6]. Our work is different from these works in
that they focus on permission usage, while our work focuses on unprotected APIs
and potential exploits. Besides permission checking, we also consider Linux ID
checking in our analysis.
The topic of system-level vulnerabilities in Android framework has been studied
before. DexDiff by Mitchell et al. [61] investigates the vulnerabilities in vendor-
customized frameworks by comparing them with the official Android systems in
binary analysis. ADDICTED by Zhou et al. [102] performs the analysis of vendor-
customized components. In particular, it identifies critical Linux files and compares
their protection levels in terms of Linux file permissions between customized frame-
work and AOSP. If a file is less protected on customized framework, then it is more
likely to be attacked. This line of works focuses on the vendor-modified components
of Android frameworks, while we focus on unprotected APIs and their exploits in
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Android frameworks. Similarly, Wu et al. [87] study vendor customizations of sys-
tem applications. They discover that the vendor-customized applications are vulner-
able to permission re-delegation attacks, confused deputy attacks, passive content
leak attacks, and content pollution attacks. Another way of Android vulnerability
analysis is performed by Yang et al. in IntentFuzzer [90] and Ye et al. in Droid-
Fuzzer [93]. They automatically construct intents and use brute force to discover
vulnerabilities. However, as stated in IntentFuzzer, their research does not pene-
trate deep into application logic nor uncover interesting bugs for launching serious
attacks. Kratos [78] also uses call graph analysis to find vulnerabilities in Android
framework. However, it focuses on the inconsistencies of security checking, while
our work focuses on APIs without any security checking.
Vulnerable components of third-party applications have been investigated be-
fore. ComDroid by Chin et. al. [15] analyze the inter-application communications
among third-party applications so as to identify vulnerable components of third-
party applications. We use a similar threat model in our analysis and apply it on
system applications. Wu et al. [86] use the reachability analysis to identify and cat-
egorize such vulnerabilities. Another work, EPICC, by Octeau et al. [68] show that
over 93% of third-party applications contain vulnerable components. To exploit the
vulnerable components, Li et al. [51] propose an approach which can automatically
generates an attack application. In comparison to these works, part of analysis in
our research focuses on intent-based vulnerabilities of system services and system
applications, rather than third party applications. On the other hand, a line of work
focuses on how to prevent attacks from exploiting vulnerable components of third-
party applications. For example, CHEX by Lu et al. [55] mitigates such attacks by
statically vetting third-party applications. AppSealer by Zhang and Yin [94] focuses
on how to generate security patches automatically so as to prevent the intent-based
attacks to vulnerable components of third-party applications. Oh et al. [69] propose
a solution to address the denial of service attacks on ordered broadcast intents.
Another line of work focuses on how to better manage the security of Android
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frameworks. Heuse et. al [42] survey different research solutions related to An-
droid access control mechanisms and propose a new general programmable inter-
face, called Android Security Module (ASM), which can be used for managing
access control policies. Likewise, Backes et al. [7] propose an Android Security
Framework (ASF), in which the access control policies for Android APIs can be
modified or extended easily by enterprises or security experts without modifying
the framework. Complementary to these works, our work focuses on unprotected
APIs and potential attacks, which could be mitigated by placing appropriate access
control mechanisms.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we show how an attacker, which is a third-party application without
any permissions, can attack Android smartphone systems by exploiting various un-
protected Android APIs, including unprotected AIDL interfaces of system services,
unprotected components of system applications, and unprotected dynamically reg-
istered broadcasts. The attacks we discover include blocking Bluetooth and email
services, controlling audio functions, stealing valuable device information, and hi-
jacking system activities and broadcasts. The result of this work suggests that An-
droid platform providers should carefully analyze the exposed APIs, and mitigate
any identified attacks. We envision that with more features added to Android de-
vices, larger source code sizes of Android frameworks, and faster paced releases of
Android versions, such analysis and mitigations are much needed to achieve better
security in Android system development.
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Chapter 4
Dissecting Policy-Violating
applications: Characterization and
Detection
4.1 Introduction
Google Play store is infected with various types of bad applications, including
malware applications, privacy-violating applications, and repackaged applications.
Google has been trying to take down these applications everyday with the help of
anti-malware technologies, such as Google Bouncer, and inputs from researchers
and users. Previously, researchers have tried to understand malware applications’
behaviors by painstakingly collecting real-life malware application samples [103].
They have also proposed various prevention or detection techniques for malware
applications [36] [1] [72], privacy-preserving applications [92] [106] [91] [88] [58]
[82], and repackaged applications [96] [101] [79] [14] [33] [98]. However, many
applications behave in a manner that is undesirable, and yet less serious than these
applications. For instance, some applications redirect users to share about the appli-
cations on Facebook page. Some are spams. Some applications simply lack proper
functionalists and qualities. These applications violate Google Play developer poli-
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cies but little has been discovered about the overall picture of these applications.
Therefore, we attempt to answer the following questions in our paper: What cate-
gories of bad applications are the most common ones on Google Play store? What
characteristics and behaviors make them reported by users and removed from the
market? Can the existing anti-virus solutions be used in detecting them?
Our paper makes the following contributions: (1) We collect a set of real-life
applications that are reported by users, and later taken down by Google Play store.
The lack of sample set has been deterring researchers from creating solutions and
evaluating their effectiveness. Our collection of real-life bad applications can serve
as a baseline for various future analysis and research (2) We perform extensive
empirical analysis on the application samples we collected. Comprehending and
characterizing these applications is the first step towards designing defense mecha-
nisms against them. Our empirical analysis provides answers to various questions
left unanswered by previous research (3) We use machine learning approach to de-
tect the collected application samples. Although machine learning algorithms have
been commonly applied for malware applications detection, different feature sets
are required for detecting our application samples due to their unique characteris-
tics and behaviors. In our paper, we also figure out whether the existing anti-virus
solutions can effectively detect these policy-violating applications.
First, we build an automated crawler, which collects real-life applications that
violate Google Play developer policies. Google enforces these policies to maintain
quality and health of mobile ecosystem as well as to provide great experience for
mobile users. Our crawler crawls the posts from Reddit forum under Bad applica-
tion category every 5 minutes. It obtains the links of reported applications from the
posts and immediately downloads them from the Google Play store. After 3 months
of automated crawling, our crawler follows the same links again and checks if the
bad applications are indeed removed from the official Google Play store. In this
way, we are able to collect 302 bad applications that are reported and removed from
the Google Play store.
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Second, we perform extensive empirical analysis on the application samples we
collected. Out of 302 crawled applications, we discover that 161 applications vi-
olate intellectual property rights of other applications or brands. The most copied
applications include Bejeweled Blitz, Candy Crush, Mine Craft, Angry Bird Rio,
Flappy Bird, Hay Day, Fruit Ninja, Subway Surf, Construction City, Sonic Dash,
Gangster Vegas, and Grand Theft Auto. The most copied trademarks or brands in-
clude Pikachu, Adobe, Pou, Mario, Disney, Mickey, Minion, Counter Strike, and
Despicable Me. The violation normally takes place in applications’ titles, descrip-
tions, icons or screen-shots. We discover that 79 of them use similar titles, 76 use
screen-shots that are different from in-app screen-shots, and 73 use mis-leading
descriptions that are different from applications’ actual functions. Many reported
bad applications use misleading keywords, such as 2, II, Demo, Free, Pro, 3D, and
HD, claiming that they are an enhanced version of original applications. Moreover,
we discover 67 applications that claim to contain certain functions but actually do
nothing. They include fingerprint scanner applications, flash light applications, font
applications, wallpaper applications, bluetooth applications, volume boosters, wifi
boosters, and mp3 downloaders.
Among the crawled applications, 147 applications violate ad policies. We dis-
cover 70 applications with ads that simulate the user interfaces of the applications,
54 applications that modify browser settings or add homescreen shortcuts on the
users’ device as a service to third parties or for advertising purpose, 34 applications
that show ads outside the applications, 17 applications from which users cannot dis-
miss their ads without penalties or inadvertent click-throughs, and 10 applications
that display ads through system level notifications. Our analysis shows that the most
common violating ad libraries include startapp, inmobi, umeng, ironsource and ac-
tionbarsherlock. Moreover, we discover that 30 applications redirect users to install
other applications from Google Play store or third-party markets, 16 applications
violate Youtube policies by downloading videos from Youtube, and 9 applications
download unwanted mp3 files. We also discover 2 applications which are automat-
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ically created by wizard services, and another 2 applications which offer incentives
to rate the applications.
Third, we apply machine learning algorithms for detecting such misbehaving
applications. To test the effectiveness of our detection, we apply it on 302 real-life
policy-violating applications that we collected and 326 benign applications from
Google Play store. We extract 175 features from the applications’ use of brand
names and keywords, third-party libraries, network activities, meta data, permis-
sions, and misbehaving API calls that are originated from third-party libraries. We
input the extracted features into 10 machine learning classifiers for differentiating
policy-violating applications from benign applications. Three-fold cross validation
is performed, where two-third of our data set is used for training and one-third of
our data set is used for testing. The experimental results show that our detection
algorithm can effectively detect bad applications with 86.80% true positive rate and
13.6% false positive rate. We also test our samples with VirusTotal [84], which
scans the submitted applications with existing 57 anti-virus solutions. We assume
that VirusTotal can detect a policy-violating application as long as one of its anti-
virus software reports it as bad. In this way, we discover that the true positive rate of
VirusTotal is 55.63% and its false positive rate is 17.48%. In terms of individual per-
formance, the best anti-virus solution of VirusTotal can detect the policy-violating
applications with the true positive rate of 36% only. Our research shows that despite
the efforts of industry and research communities in application market regulation,
the problem of policy-violating applications is still prevalent and requires attention
from both industry and research communities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 clarifies our data
collection process. Section 4.3 provides our empirical analysis and findings. Sec-
tion 4.4 describes the details of our detection mechanism, and Section 4.5 discusses
the experiment results. Section 4.6 summarizes the related work and Section 4.7
concludes the paper.
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4.2 Data Collection
In this section, we describe how we collect policy-violating application samples.
These samples are very useful for analyzing the applications’ behaviors and con-
sequently for designing defense mechanisms and evaluating them. However, ob-
taining a set of policy-violating applications is not trivial. There are two challenges
to it. The first challenge is noticing what applications are violating Google play
policies, because users’ reports to Google Play store are not available to the public.
To solve this, we seek to a public forum, Reddit, for such application reports by
users. The second challenge is that there is a small time frame to crawl or download
policy-violating applications from Google Play, once the report has been made. To
solve this, we develop an automated crawler for downloading bad applications and
creating a database of bad applications. We plan to make the dataset available to the
public, after this paper is published.
To find users’ reports, we first crawl posts from Reddit forum under the
https://www.reddit.com /r/Badapplications URL. This URL is a
subReddit (i.e. sub-forum) used to report inappropriate applications to Google. The
description of the subReddit is as follows. “A subreddit to discuss and coordinate
reporting bad applications to the Google Play Store. Note: A bad application refers
to applications that are fake, pretending to be from different developer, harmful, are
there just to serve annoying ads to you, or steal your info. An application that is just
poorly made should not be posted here, they are fine.” Reddit provides Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) for various functions, including messaging, editing
posts and reading posts. The returned objects are in JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) format. We develop a Python crawler, which checks the BadApp subReddit
forum every 5 minutes for latest users’ posts and comments. Once we find a new
link of reported app, we crawl the applications’ metadata, as well as Android Ap-
plication Package (APK) files from the Google Play store. The crawling continues
for over 3 month period. After that, we check the same links of the applications
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again, and see if they are indeed removed from the Google Play store. In this way,
we crawl about 302 policy-violating applications.
The second set of our data is benign applications from Google Play store. We
randomly download 326 benign applications, which exist for at least 3 months from
the Google Play store with an unofficial Python API.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we perform empirical analysis on our bad application samples and
explain our findings on their characteristics and behaviors. To understand their be-
haviors, we first put the Google Play’s developer policies into four main categories:
(1) intellectual property and deception, (2) monetization and ads, (3) spam, store
listing and promotion, and (4) security and privacy. Although restricted content,
such as sexually explicit content and violence, are parts of Google Play policies, we
do not find any applications violating these policies. Table 4.1 shows the results of
our empirical analysis. We discover that more than half of bad applications are vio-
lating copy-rights or trademarks and about half of bad applications are violating ad
policies. Many applications show several other bad behaviors, such as spamming,
violating Youtube policies and downloading external files. The most common types
of policy violations are (i) applications that use similar title to branded applications,
(ii) applications that use photos or screenshots from other brands, (iii) applications
that provide misleading description, (iv) applications that have little or no functions,
and (v) applications that hold ads simulating the user interfaces.
Category Policy Violating Behaviors No of
apps
Icon
(Copy-right)
Same as the icon of original app 4
Similar to the icon of original app 15
Violates copyright or trademark of original app (e.g.
copying title, screenshots, in-app real screenshots of
original app)
52
Violates copyright or trademark of other brands or
websites
32
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Title
(Copy-right)
Same as the original app 3
Similar to the original app 79
Violates copyright or trademark of other brands or
websites
35
Screenshot
(Copy-right)
Same as the original app 35
Similar to the original app 4
Violates copyright or trademark of original app (e.g.
copying title, in-app real screenshots)
39
Violates copyright or trademark of other brands or
websites
38
Different from the real in-app screen 76
Description
(Copy-right)
Same as the original app 5
Similar to the original app 36
Violates copyright or trademark of original app (e.g.
including other apps brand names)
41
Violates copyright or trademark of other brands or
websites
38
Different from actual function (Misleading descrip-
tions)
73
Irrelevant and excessive keywords in apps descrip-
tions
22
Function
(Copy-right)
Very little or no function (e.g. blank page or a video
keeps playing)
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Same as the original app 6
Similar to the original app 5
Violates copyright or trademark of original app (e.g.
including other apps resources)
7
Violates copyright or trademark of other brands or
websites
19
The apps primary function is to reproduce or frame
someone elses website (i.e. web-view of anther
website)
19
Ads
Ads simulate or impersonate the user interface of
any app
70
Ads are displayed outside the app (Ads simulate or
impersonate UI notification and warning elements of
the operation system)
34
Displays advertisements through system level noti-
fications (Push notifications)
10
Users cannot dismiss the ads without penalty or in-
advertent click-through (e.g. exit ads)
17
Modifies or adds browser settings or bookmarks,
adds homescreen shortcuts, or icons on the users de-
vice as a service to third parties or for advertising
purpose
54
Spams
Created by an automated tool or wizard service and
submitted to Google Play by the operator of that ser-
vice on behalf of other persons
2
Offer incentives for rating 2
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Others
Violates Youtube policies 16
Automatically redirects users to install other apps
(including other third-party market apps) from
Google Play
30
Includes buttons in apps to download other apps
from Google Play
49
Forces users to download files or install apps from
sources outside of Google Play
25
Downloads unwanted mp3 files 9
Table 4.1: Empirical Analysis on Policy Violations
Intellectual Property Right Violations
The first five categories of policy-violating behaviors in Table 4.1 are related to copy-right
or trademark violations. Copying may occurs in five places of bad applications: icons,
titles, screenshots, descriptions or functions. An interesting finding is that more copying
applications make their icon, title and descriptions similar to those of original applications,
instead of copying the exact features. Further analysis shows that reported applications tend
to use the keywords, such as 2, II, Demo, Free, Pro, 3D, and HD, in their titles claiming
that they are an enhanced version of original applications. Moreover, we discover that
more bad applications make their icons from the screenshots included in the metadata of
original applications or in-app real screenshots of original applications. However, many
of them use the same screenshots that as the original applications. These findings have
several implications for detecting applications that violate intellectual property rights. For
instance, similarity scores between icons of copying applications, and screenshots of copied
applications should play an important role in detecting such applications. We also discover
that many of them uses screen-shots that are different from in-app screen-shots and mis-
leading descriptions that are different from applications’ actual functions. This suggests
that if we can find discrepancies in these bad applications, we will be able to detect them
well.
We discover that there exist not only applications which copy other original applications
but also applications which violate the copy-rights or trademarks of other brand or websites.
For instance, some applications include intellectual properties of Pokemon or Play Station
although these original companies do not have any related applications in the Google Play
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store. We further analyze applications and brands that these bad applications normally copy.
They include Bejeweled Blitz, Candy Crush, Mine Craft, Angry Bird Rio, Flappy Bird, Hay
Day, Fruit Ninja, Subway Surf, Construction City, Sonic Dash, Gangster Vegas, and Grand
Theft Auto. The brands or trademarks that are violated include Pikachu, Adobe, Pou, Mario,
Disney, Mickey, Minion, Counter Strike, and Despicable Me.
Interestingly, we only find 11 repackaged applications whose functions are exactly the
same or similar to original applications. This shows that although bad applications are one
of the main distribution channels of malware, they are only a small portion of entire policy-
violating applications. applications that claim to contain some functions but actually doing
nothing include fingerprint scanner, flash light applications, font applications, wallpaper
applications, bluetooth applications, volume boosters, wifi boosters, MP3 downloaders, and
other music downloaders. The primary functions of some bad applications are to redirect
users to other websites. We also find 22 applications which use irrelevant and excessive
keywords in application descriptions. For example, some font applications use “Samsung
Galaxy” keyword extensively in their descriptions to direct mobile users to their applications
during the search. Such applications mostly reduce the quality of the application market.
Ad Policy Violations
The past studies on ad libraries have been focusing on privacy issues, such as phone ID
and location collection by ad libraries. However, our empirical analysis results show a
different set of policy-violating ad libraries. Our data set includes 70 applications with ads
which simulate or impersonate user interfaces of the applications. We also discover 54 ad-
policy violating applications that modify browser bookmarks or add homescreen shortcuts
on users’ mobile phones. Moreover, we find 34 applications, which display ads outside the
applications using warning elements of Android. We also discover 17 applications where
users cannot dismiss ads without penalty or inadvertent click-through and 10 applications
where ads are sent via system notifications.
The most common policy-violating ad libraries are Start App, Inmobi, Umeng, and
IronSource. Start App library shows interstitial ads, splash ads, exit ads, native ads and re-
ward ads. Inmobi ad library includes interstitial ads and native ads. Umeng ad library sends
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ads via system notification bar, downloads and requests installation of new applications, and
send information to a remote location about currently running applications, installed appli-
cations, and device information such as International Mobile Station Equipment Identity
(IMEI), kernel version, phone manufacturer, phone model details, location (such as GPS
coordinates, cell tower location), and network operator information. Ironsource library dis-
plays native ads and video ads.
In addition to ad libraries, we discover other common types of libraries among
bad applications, including (i) com.unips, which provide live wallpaper adware, (ii)
com.monotype, which claims to provide free font, (iii) com.rahul, which provides
Youtube downloader, (iv) com.unity3d and org.andengine, which are game de-
veloping libraries, and (v) io.card credit card scanning library under the URL https:
//github.com/card-io/card.io-Android-SDK.
Spams
Some applications violate policies by applying automated application creation tools, such
as https://www.applicationsgeyser.com/, or offering incentives for rating the
applications. We find only 2 applications in each category. Despite this small number,
we notice during crawling that some Reddit-forum users report developers who are spam-
ming the market by creating hundreds of similar applications. Studying these spammers
requires different kind of analysis on developer accounts in addition to applications them-
selves. Thus, we leave them as future work.
Others
We discover other applications that misbehaves, but Google’s developer policies do not
cover. They include applications that violate Youtube policies, redirect users to other ap-
plications, and force users to download unwanted files. We discover that 25 applications
force users to download mobogenie.apk file, which enables control from a remote com-
puter. Mobogenie may also be used to download applications, images, videos or music
to mobile phones, manage SD cards, create backups on computer, and edit phone con-
tacts. We find 30 applications, which redirect users to spearmintbrowser.com, which
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claims to provide AdBlock and build-in Flash support features. We also discover 10 ap-
plications, which download APK file named as flash player, 80 bad applications, which
redirect users to download other applications from Google play and other third-party mar-
kets, and 12 applications, which connect to and grab data from Youtube. Many applica-
tions also access mobile users’ accounts by obtaining authentication tokens: 118 applica-
tions access to Google account, 8 to PayPal account and 24 to Twitter account. Moreover,
we find out that 29 bad applications attempt to share posts on users’ Facebook account
using URLs, such as https://m.facebook.com/dialog/feed?app id={0}&link={1}&picture=
{2}&name={3}&description={4}&redirect uri={5}.
4.4 Detection
Our detection includes two steps: (1) extracting typical features from both bad applications
and benign applications and (2) applying selected machine learning algorithms to detect bad
applications. The detection can be performed by either security researchers or Google Play
Store managers for vetting submitted applications before they are officially released.
4.4.1 Feature Extraction
Classes Methods
android.app.NotificationManager notify()
android.app.AlertDialog.Builder show()
android.widget.Toast show()
android.provider.Browser saveBookmark()
android.provider.Browser sendString()
android.content.Context startActivity()
android.net.Uri parse()
java.lang.ClassLoader loadClass()
java.lang.Class forName()
java.lang.Class getDeclaredMethod()
java.lang.Class getMethod()
java.lang.reflect.Method invoke()
dalvik.system.PathClassLoader init()
dalvik.system.DexClassLoader init()
dalvik.system.DexFile loadDex()
Table 4.2: APIs Used as Features in our Detection
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We extract six groups of features from mobile applications, including the use of brand
names, third-party libraries, network activities, meta data, permissions, and API calls. The
features can be grouped into two. The first category includes features derived from our
empirical findings, such as popular brands or application names, network activities and
third-party libraries. The second category is based on behavior-based features, such as per-
mission and API-based features. Our feature extraction is implemented in Python, and
detection algorithms are run in Java. In particular, Androguard library [21] is used to
reverse engineer the application codes, and extract the information about third-party li-
braries, network activities, permissions and API calls. To obtain third-party libraries, we
first use the dx.get tainted packages().get packages() method of Andro-
guard to obtain package lists from applications and then, we exclude the package names
of the applications. To analyze the network activities, we first obtain the String values of
APK files via the d.get strings() method, and then, filter out the values starting with
“http://” or “https://”. For searching the API calls from third-party libraries, we
apply dx.tainted packages.search methods() method, and determine whether
they are originated from application source codes or third-party libraries’ source codes.
Use of Brand Names and Other Keywords
We blacklist a list of popular brands and application names that we have obtained from our
empirical analysis. Each brand name represents a feature for our detection. We also include
other keywords, such as 2, II, Demo, Free, Pro, 3D, and HD as features. Overall, we use
the following 56 words as features in our detection: ’flash’, ’light’, ’bejeweled’, ’blitz’,
’wAsk’, ’racing’, ’live’, ’wallpaper’, ’construction’, ’city’, ’studio’, ’candy’, ’bluetooth’,
’free’, ’game’, ’sniper’, ’crime’, ’craft’, ’mine’, ’pikachu’, ’font’, ’farm’, ’app’, ’video’,
’download’, ’tube’, ’pou’, ’gangster’, ’bird’, ’flappy’, ’subway’, ’surf’, ’dash’, ’grand’,
’theft’, ’sonic’, ’rio’, ’ninja’, ’demo’, ’pro’, ’3D’, ’2’, ’II’, ’hay’, ’day’, ’flv’, ’adobe’, ’in-
stall’, ’despicable’, ’font’, ’galaxy’, ’monotype’, ’volume’, ’boost’, ’mp3’, and ’music’.
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Third-Party Libraries
We blacklist the following 16 third-party ad libraries that are shown to include aggressive
ad behaviors: ’startapp’, ’inmobi’, ’umeng’, ’ironsource’, ’actionbarsherlock’, ’millennial-
media’, ’adsdk’, ’revmob’, ’chartboost’, ’fmod’, ’furry’, ’mobclix’, ’appflood’, ’tapjoy’,
’jirbo’, and ’squareup’. The presence of each library is regarded as one feature in our detec-
tion.
Network Activities
We maintain the following 20 blacklisted servers, and determine whether applications
connect to them in their APK files: ’admob’, ’gstatic’, ’startappexchange’, ’ad-market’,
’search-results’, ’inmobi’, ’umeng’, ’googleapis’, ’akamaihd’, ’applicationsdt’, ’spearmint-
browser’, ’mobilecore’, ’avazutracking’, ’cloudfront’, ’youtube’, ’rightyoo’, ’iron’, ’scm-
pacdn’, ’airpush’, and ’ytimg’.
Meta Data
From the metadata of an app, we extract the number of downloads, the app’s APK file
size, the number of ratings, the average star rating, the number of users rating one star, the
number of users rating two star, the number of users rating three star, the number of users
rating four star and the number of users rating five star. Thus, the meta data contribute 9
features for our detection.
Permissions
We use the the following 20 permissions as features in our detection. The first six per-
missions are derived from our empirical analysis of bad applications, which shows that
many reported applications ask for credentials, contact list and hardware control, such as
camera, audio or video. The next six permissions, such as INSTALL SHORTCUT and
WRITE HISTORY BOOKMARKS, are relevant to adware behaviors. The rest of the permis-
sions, such as BILLING and SEND SMS, are relevant to malware behaviors.
• android.permission.USE CREDENTIALS
• android.permission.READ CONTACTS
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• android.permission.RECORD AUDIO
• android.permission.CAMERA
• android.permission.CAPTURE VIDEO OUTPUT
• android.permission.CAPTURE SECURE VIDEO OUTPUT
• android.permission.ACCESS FINE LOCATION
• com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL SHORTCUT
• android.launcher.permission.INSTALL SHORTCUT
• com.android.browser.permission.READ HISTORY BOOKMARKS
• com.android.browser.permission.WRITE HISTORY BOOKMARKS
• android.permission.WRITE SETTINGS
• android.permission.INTERNAL SYSTEM WINDOW
• android.permission.BILLING
• android.permission.SEND SMS
• android.permission.CALL PHONE
• android.permission.PROCESS OUTGOING CALLS
• android.permission.INSTALL PACKAGES
• android.permission.RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED
• android.permission.WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE
API Calls
We identify 15 API calls that are required to complete specific behaviors of bad applications.
Table 4.2 shows the list of API calls used in our detection. The first six API calls are required
for adware behaviors, such as sending ads as notifications and changing browser settings.
The rest of the APIs are used for Java reflection and dynamic code loading, since they
are normally used by malicious applications to avoid being detected in static analysis. We
extract 3 features from each API calls: presence of identified API calls, number of calls and
whether the class files making the API calls are obfuscated. In total, we extract 45 features
from API calls.
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Others
There are other 4 types of features that we use for our detection. The first feature is whether
the applications import cryptographic package javax.crypto because many malicious
applications are known to encrypt and decrypt their codes. Another feature is whether the
application files overwrite the onBackPressed() method, since this API is called by
applications with exit ads. We also determine whether the APK codes include suspicious
strings, such as com.android.launcher. action.INSTALL SHORTCUT, since
homescreen shortcuts may be added via intents with the above action strings. The final
feature is whether applications include any string literals ending with “.apk”, because many
bad applications force users to download and install external APK files. Similar to API
calls, we derive 3 types of information for each feature: presence of identified API calls,
number of calls and whether the class files making the API calls are obfuscated
Algorithm True Positive False Positive Precision Recall F-Measure
Naive Bayes 0.780 0.216 0.785 0.780 0.780
Logistic regression 0.774 0.228 0.774 0.774 0.774
SMO 0.868 0.136 0.871 0.868 0.867
Lazy-Ibk 0.828 0.177 0.833 0.828 0.827
Random Committee 0.855 0.148 0.857 0.855 0.855
Decision Table 0.750 0.256 0.754 0.750 0.748
PART 0.812 0.190 0.812 0.812 0.812
J48 0.815 0.188 0.817 0.815 0.815
LMT 0.854 0.151 0.857 0.854 0.853
Random Forest Tree 0.852 0.152 0.855 0.852 0.851
Table 4.3: Evaluation of Our Detection Algorithm
4.4.2 Detection
We apply 10 commonly used machine learning classifiers using Weka library [38]. The
classifiers include Naive Bayes, Logistic, Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO), Lazy-
Ibk, Random Committee, Decision Table, Decision Part, J48, Logistic Model Tree (LMT),
and Random Forest Tree. Naive Bayes is a family of simple probabilistic classifiers based on
the Bayes’ theorem. Logistic classifier applies the regression model, SMO applies Support
Vector Machines (SVM), and Lazy - Ibk classifier applies K-nearest neighbours algorithm.
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Figure 4.1: Detection Result by Anti-Virus Software from VirusTotal
Random Committee classifier uses a group of base classifiers, and the result is the average of
the predictions generated by the individual base classifiers. Decision Table classifier uses a
simple decision table. J48 Tree classifier, LMT classifier and Random Forest Tree classifier
are algorithms based on decision trees.
4.5 Evaluation
In our evaluation, we apply the 10 classifiers to 628 applications used for our evaluation,
including 302 reported bad applications and 326 benign applications. The 3-fold cross-
validation is used for reducing over-fitting in our evaluation, where two-third of our data set
is used for training and one-third is used for testing. Table 4.3 shows the weighted average of
true positives, false positives, precision, recall and f-measures of our detection algorithms.
True positive rates indicate the percentage of real malicious bad applications among the
reported bad applications. False positive rates indicate the percentage of bad applications
that are reported but are not really malicious. Precision is the ratio of true positives to true
positives plus false positives. Recall is the ratio of true positives to true positives plus false
negatives. F-measure combines precision and recall, and can be used as an overall measure
for evaluation. For true positive rate, precision, recall and f-measure, the higher the scores
are, the better the algorithm performs. The reverse is true for false positive rate.
In terms of f-measure, SMO classifier performs the best, followed by Random Commit-
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tee and LMT classifiers. SMO classifier uses SVM, which is known to be the best classifier
in many general cases. At the same time, Random Committee and LMT classifiers are good
at dealing with binary and multi-class target variables, numeric and nominal attributes as
well as missing values. Thus, they seem to be well-suited for our data set. The least effec-
tive classifiers are Naive Bayes, Logistic regression, and Decision Table classifiers. This is
mainly due to the fact that Naive Bayes and Logistic regression classifiers perform the best
for categorical dependent variables, while our dependent variables include non-categorical
features, such as star ratings and numbers of downloads. Moreover, simple decision table
classifier may not capture the complex rules of our feature set. We expect our results to be
improved by focusing on the individual types of policy-violating applications. By doing so,
we can select the features based on the behaviors specific to the types of applications. For
instance, we can apply text and image similarity features for detecting intellectual property
right violating applications. We leave this as future work, since the purpose of this paper is
to characterize and detect all policy-violating applications.
We also compare our result with VirusTotal, which scans the uploaded applications with
57 anti-virus software. We submitted our 302 policy-violating applications to VirusTotal an
retrieved the scanned report. Overall scan report shows that VirusTotal can detect only 168
of the submitted applications with its 57 anti-virus software. The remaining 134 applications
are never alerted by any of the anti-virus software. At the same time, VirusTotal falsely
reports 57 benign applications as policy-violating applications. Thus, we can say that the
true positive rate of VirusTotal is 55.63% and the false positive rate of VirusTotal is 17.48%.
The numbers of reported policy-violating applications (i.e. true positives) by individual
anti-virus solutions are shown in Figure 4.1.
4.6 Related Work
Although there are limited studies on intellectual property right violating applications, there
are many studies on the repackaged applications. Repackaged applications are the clones
created from the reverse-engineered codes of original applications. Balanza et al.[8] analyze
a repackaged malware, called DroidDreamLight, and Jung et al. [47] launch repackaging
attack on bank applications. Chen et al. [13], and Gibler et al. [34] study the impact of
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repackaged applications and find out that 14% of original developers’ revenues and 10%
of user are redirected to the attacker. Potharaju et al. [74] use permission information and
estimate that 29.4% of applications are likely to be plagiarized.
Since repackaged applications contain similar source codes as original applications,
their detection mechanisms focus on the source code similarities. DroidMOSS [101] and
Juxtapp [40] [52] apply fuzzy hashing on program instruction sequence and derive the sim-
ilarity score by calculating the edit distance between two generated fingerprints. Crussell
et al. [?] propose DNADroid, which uses Program Dependence Graph(PDG) to determine
code similarity. AnDarwin [17] applies Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH), Lin et al. [54]
use thread-grained system call sequences and Zhou et al. [100] propose linearithmic search
algorithm in a metric space to detect repackaged applications. Deckard [46] uses a tree-
based detection algorithm for detection. Huang et al. [43] propose an evaluation framework
for detection algorithms of repackaged applications by measuring their resilience to obfus-
cation methods. Different from other approaches, Zhou et al. [99] propose to use software
watermarking to prevent repackaging. Since these methods only focuses on code similarity,
they cannot detect applications, which copy the external features of original applications
and not their source codes.
Similar to our paper, several previous work highlights various issues of ad libraries.
However, they focus more on privacy, security and usability issues, and not on their aggres-
siveness for showing ads or obtaining clicks from users. Adrisk [37] applies static analysis
on top 100 commonly used ad libraries, and shows that most ad libraries collect private in-
formation, including users’ location, call logs, phone number, browser bookmarks, and the
list of installed applications on the phone. Moreover, some libraries directly fetch and run
code from the Internet. Book et al. [11] make a longitudinal analysis of permissions used
by ad libraries, and discovers that dangerous permission usage by ad libraries are increasing
over time.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we perform extensive empirical analysis on bad applications that are reported
and removed from Google Play store. These bad applications are diligently collected by
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crawling Reddit forum posts and Google Play store over a three-month period. Our anal-
ysis of the data set provides a comprehensive overview of reported bad applications and
their policy-violating behaviors. Our findings show that detecting copy-right violating ap-
plications and ad-aggressive applications is important for maintaining good quality of future
mobile application market. Thus, we urge industry and research communities to give more
attention to these areas. Our paper also includes detection of bad applications using ma-
chine learning classifiers. We derive features based on the results of our findings as well
as behavior-based features. Although our current solution is performing well for detecting
policy-violating applications, we believe that better solutions can be invented by focusing
on each type of policy-violating applications.
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Chapter 5
Detecting Camouflaged Applications
On Mobile Application Markets
5.1 Introduction
With the growing number of third-party applications on mobile market places, it becomes
increasingly hard to manage these applications and ensure that they are authentic, secure
and of high quality. One of the emerging problems that the market owners encounter is
plagiarism or cloning of mobile applications. During cloning, malicious parties copy all or
parts of original applications and create similar applications or the clones. Such application
plagiarism causes two main problems in mobile application markets. Firstly, it allows ma-
licious parties to siphon revenues from original developers by replacing the advertisement
libraries of plagiarised applications or by selling the clones with different prices to users.
It has been shown that original developers, who are the victims of plagiarism, lost 14% of
their advertising revenues and 10% of their user base to the attackers [34]. Secondly, there
are cases, where attackers add malicious payloads to the clones of popular applications and
threaten the security and privacy of mobile application users. In a recent study by Zheng
M. et. al [104], cloning is even regarded as one of the main distribution channels of mobile
malwares.
Thus, to hinder application plagiarism, a number of clone detection methods have been
proposed in [101] [40] [52] [16]. However, these methods only focuses on repackaged
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applications, which are the clones created from the reverse-engineered codes of original
applications. As such, these methods only search for code similarities among applications,
consequently missing out a different set of clones, called camouflaged applications. Hence,
in this chapter, we introduce the concept of camouflaged applications. Camouflaged appli-
cations are applications whose external information, such as application names, icons, user
interfaces or application descriptions, are cloned. These clones may or may not have sim-
ilar codes as original applications but like other clones, they plagiarise and take advantage
of other applications without consensus from original developers. They are not only con-
fusing and harmful to the users but also discourage application development by affecting
developers’ reputation and monetary profits.
Therefore, in this chapter, we propose a detection framework for finding camouflaged
applications. Our method is based on external features of applications and applies text
similarity and image similarity measurements, calculated by information retrieval systems.
Although information retrieval systems have been applied to detect phishing web pages,
we are the first to apply these technologies to efficiently detect camouflaged applications
in mobile platforms. Our detection framework is tested with 30,625 Android applications
from Google Play market. The experiment shows that 477 applications (1.56%) are poten-
tial camouflaged applications. We further analyze the behaviors of detected camouflaged
applications and inspect the false alarms rate of our detection method. A total of 44 false
positives, which is 9.22% of tested application samples, are identified.
This chapter is organized as follows. Problem definition of camouflaged applications
and threat model are provided in Section 5.2. Background information about information
retrieval systems and repackaged applications are given in Section 5.3. Our detection frame-
work is proposed in Section 5.4 and our experiment results are shown in Section 5.5. Dis-
cussion about our findings, limitations of our method and future direction are provided in
Section 5.6. After that, related work on repackaged applications are summarized in Sec-
tion 5.7 and we conclude the chapter in Section 5.8.
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5.2 Problem Definition
Informally, camouflaged applications are defined as “copycat” applications or “confusingly
similar” applications. There have been a lot of such applications on both official Google
Play store and Apple’s iTunes store. Generally, the features being cloned in camouflaged
applications are icons, names, screenshots and descriptions. For instance, there are cam-
ouflaged applications with very similar names, such as “Irate Birds” for the official “Angry
Birds” and “Snip the Rope” for the official “Cute the Rope” 1. Moreover, some camouflaged
applications focus on screenshots to deceive users. For example, fake Pokemon Yellow ap-
plication used Nintendo’s popular Game Boy RPG as its application screenshots. It even
managed to rise to top 3 position on iTunes store before being removed [71].
Camouflaged applications may exist on different application markets of the same plat-
forms or across different platforms. According to Zhou et al. [101], 5-13% of the applica-
tions from unofficial Android market places are cloned from the official Google Play mar-
ket. In addition, some clones may also spans across different platforms, such as Android
or iOS. For instance, fake versions of popular iOS applications, such as Infinity Blade II 2
and Temple Run 3, appeared on Google Play, even before their official releases in Android
version.
Market owners have imposed various developer policies for trademarks, copyrights, and
patents of applications. For instance, Google Play has a policy for impersonation, stating
(1) not to pretend as another company, (2) not to link to another website to represent itself
as another application and (3) not to use another application’s branding in title and descrip-
tion [73]. Moreover, Google Play’s Trademark Infringement policy suggests to use distinct
name, icon and logo and not to use those that are “confusingly similar” to another com-
pany’s trademark. However, according to Liebergeld et al. [53], there is insufficient market
control in Google Play market, because uploaded applications are not checked upfront on
whether they indeed follow the policies. The policy enforcement relies heavily on feedbacks
from users and developers.
1http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2012/08/google-play-cracks-down-on-confusingly-similar-
apps/
2http://www.pocketgamer.co.uk/r/Android/Infinity+Blade+II/news.asp?c=43572
3http://m.androidcentral.com/temple-run-android-still-isnt-out-anything-else-just-malware
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Threat Model: The main goal of attackers is to trick users into installing their cam-
ouflaged applications. There are two ways by which users can install applications on their
mobile devices. One way is to use default installer applications, such as Play Store or iTune
Store, on mobile devices. Another way is to use desktop browsers, download applications
from the providers’ websites and later synchronize the applications to their mobile devices.
In both cases, there are two situations in which user can be tricked to install the camouflaged
applications. One is during the search and another is after the user goes to the detailed in-
formation page.
• When browsing applications or searching for an application, users can only observe
application icons, application names and publishing company names. Some users
download applications directly from the search results, instead of going to the de-
tailed pages. Therefore, these three pieces of information play an important role in
tricking the users. Although the ranking algorithm used by the Google also plays a
role, it is out of scope of this work.
• In the detailed information pages, application descriptions and screenshots are the
main visual elements for users. Thus, they also play a critical role in tricking the
users by attackers.
There are several ways in which attackers can gain profit for creating camouflaged ap-
plications. Table 5.1 summarizes different attackers’ motivations as well as various possible
attacks from camouflaged applications. Attack type may vary from mild copy-right viola-
tion and information theft to severe phishing and malware attacks. From the table, we can
see that in addition to users and developers, other third-parties, such as banks and telecom
providers, can be adversely affected by camouflaged applications.
5.3 Background
5.3.1 Information Retrieval Systems
Information retrieval systems are used for retrieving relevant information from a collection
of information resources. Most information retrieval systems includes two processes: in-
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Attacker Motivation Attack
Type
Mainly Affected Parties
Replacing advertise libraries Copy-right
violation
Developers
Creating paid version of free ap-
plications
Copy-right
violation
Developers
Selling users’ information to
third parties
Information
theft
Users
Stealing users’ bank credentials Phishing Users and banks
Sending premium SMSes Malware Users and telecom providers
Table 5.1: Categorizing Attacks of Camouflaged Applications
dexing and retrieving. During indexing, the systems process documents that are either text
documents or image, and extract useful information from them. During retrieving steps,
query objects that are also processed, cleaned and their useful information are extracted.
Then, similarity distance are measured between the query document and a collection of
documents by using their representations. Ranked or sorted results are then returned to the
users, together with the similarity scores.
Information retrieval techniques have also been used to detect phishing websites [95]
[89]. However, the traditional phishing detection methods cannot be applied directly on
platform providers’ websites, such as Google Play Store. This is because camouflaged
applications and original applications can be featured on the same official website. Thus,
meta-data analysis of web contents, such as hyper-links, web titles, web links, etc, cannot
be applied in detecting camouflaged applications.
5.3.2 Repackaging and Code-Based Detectors
Cloned applications are often the result of repackaging, which includes recovering source
codes of original applications and illegally re-compiling them with different developers’
certificates. Repackaging is common in Android application platform. In Android applica-
tions, Java source code are compiled into the Dalvik executable (DEX) format and run in
Dalvik virtual machines. Dalvik byte codes can be easily reverse engineered by publicly
available online tools, such as dex2jar and jd-gui.
As the repackaged clones are created from source codes of original applications, their
source codes are similar to certain extent. Thus, code-based detectors can be used to de-
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tect repackaged applications. Generally, there are three types of code similarity detectors:
feature-based, structure-based and PDG (Program Dependence Graph)-based. Feature-
based detectors extracts features, such as number or size of classes, methods, loops, vari-
ables, from the applications and detects their similarities. Structure-based detectors convert
applications into a stream of tokens and compare their streams. On the other hand, PDG-
based detectors construct PDGs from the applications and compare them to derive the sim-
ilarity scores. Many other code-based detectors, that have been proposed for repackaged
applications, will be discussed more in Section 4.6.
5.4 A Framework for Detecting Camouflaged Appli-
cations
Accuracy and scalability are the key factors, considering the number of third-party applica-
tions in mobile markets. Thus, the goal of this work is to have a lightweight simple detection
system, which can efficiently detects the camouflaged applications. The implementation of
our framework should allow developers to check their applications before submitting to the
application stores. It can also used by Google Play for vetting before or after the application
submission.
Our system leverages on the light-weight information retrieval systems, such as text re-
trieval and content-based image retrieval systems. There are four features with which we
try to find camouflaged applications: application name, description, icon and screenshot.
Application name and descriptions are handled by text retrieval systems, while application
icon and screenshots are handled by image retrieval system. Figure 5.1 shows the archi-
tecture of our detection system. Our detection system includes four main steps: crawling,
indexing, querying and detecting.
5.4.1 Crawling
First, we need a collection of existing applications, with which the potential camouflaged
applications are compared. This application collection can be from different markets of
different mobile platforms, depending on where we want to detect camouflaged applica-
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Figure 5.1: Framework for Detecting Camouflaged Applications
tions. For instance, if we want to detect camouflaged applications, which are uploaded
on unofficial Android markets, existing application collection should be crawled from offi-
cial Google Play market and tested applications should be crawled from unofficial Android
markets. However, if we want to detect camouflaged applications on Google Play’s Android
market, which are copied from iTunes market, the existing application collection should be
from official Google Play market and tested applications should be from Apple’s iTunes
market.
Our framework is independent of mobile platform and application market. It can be
used on any platforms or markets as long as the market displays application names, icons,
screenshots and descriptions. In our experiment, we crawled applications from official An-
droid market and detect camouflaged applications within the same market. We use unofficial
Google API to crawl App info, such as id, name, developer, rating as well as application
description, icon and screenshots. Total of 30,625 applications are crawled for the experi-
ment.
5.4.2 Indexing
The second step of most information retrieval systems is indexing. During indexing, a col-
lection of documents are cleaned and processed to get ready for queries. We call both texts
and images as “documents”. Indexing can be done offline and just one time. Therefore, it
is suitable for a large collection of documents. For each application in our 30,625 crawled
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applications, we create a name index, description index, icon index and screenshot index.
Name and description indexes are created by text retrieval engines, while icon and screen-
shot indexes are handled by image retrieval engine.
Text Indexing
There are many types of text retrieval systems, such as boolean model, vector space model,
probabilistic models. Most of them can be plugged and played in our detection framework.
However, in our experiment, vector space model is used as it applies similar-word matching
instead of exact-word matching algorithm. In the vector space model, each document is
represented by a weighted vector in high-dimensional space. The weights from vectors are
measured by TF-IDF scheme, which stands for Term Frequency (TF) and Inverse Document
Frequency (IDF). Open-source software, such as Lucene [60], can be used to implement TF-
IDF scheme. Tokenizing, stemming and removal of stop words are all handled by Lucene.
Image Indexing
Similar to text retrieval methods, there are also many types of image retrieval methods.
They extract visual features from the images and index those features with a pointer to the
parent image. The extracted features include colors, color distributions, textures or joint
histograms, which involve both color and texture information. Different algorithms have
their own advantages and disadvantages on performance and robustness depending on the
applied scenarios and types of images. We choose auto color correlogram algorithm [44],
which uses the spatial correlation of colors. The algorithm is tested using SIMPLIcity data
set [85] and is shown to be both effective and inexpensive in general purpose situations [59].
Note that our framework can also be easily modified to use other visual information retrieval
algorithms. We use an open-source software, LIRE [56], to perform the visual information
retrieval.
5.4.3 Querying and Retrieving
The third step is to query the index databases with potential camouflaged applications. In
our case, the same 30,625 crawled applications are used as potential camouflaged applica-
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tions. For each queried application, we retrieved applications, which have similar user inter-
faces but are from different developers. Information retrieval systems are used to calculate
the similarity scores, and developer ID information, obtained from Google Play website, is
used to ensure that similar applications are not from the same developer.
For each query, information retrieval systems calculate the cosine similarity score be-
tween query document and a set of indexed documents. The cosine similarity score mea-
sures the similarity distance between two vector representations of documents. The score
ranges from 0 to 1, where similarity score of 0 represents two totally different documents
and similarity score of 1 represents two totally similar documents. The retrieved similar-
ity score are then used to rank the documents. In our case, retrieved set of applications is
sorted based on the decreasing similarity scores, meaning the most similar ones are on the
top of the list. We only use top-ten similar applications in each retrieved set to reduce false
positives.
The output of each queried application is four sets of similar applications, namely I, S,
N and D, where
• I is a set of applications that have similar icons as queried application,
• S is a set of applications that have similar screenshots as queried application,
• N is a set of applications that have similar names as queried application and
• D is a set of applications that have similar description as queried application.
Each set contains at most ten similar applications and many sets have fewer than ten
applications. Note that although we use the same application set for indexing and querying,
different application set can also be applied in our architecture if we want to differentiate
camouflaged applications across different markets.
5.4.4 Detecting
The fourth step of our framework is detection. Our detection method is different intersection
sets of the four retrieved set I, S, N and D. This step generates the following five different
result sets for each potential camouflaged application.
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Figure 5.2: Number of Camouflaged Applications for Each Detection Method
• Intersect(I,S,N,D) is a set of applications that have similar icons, screenshots, names
and descriptions as queried application,
• Intersect(I,S,N) is a set of applications that have similar icons, screenshots and names
as queried application but are not included in Intersect(I,S,N,D),
• Intersect(I,S,D) is a set of applications that have similar icons, screenshots and de-
scriptions as queried application but are not included in Intersect(I,S,N,D),
• Intersect(I,N,D) is a set of applications that have similar icons, names and descrip-
tions as queried application but are not included in Intersect(I,S,N,D),
• Intersect(S,N,D) is a set of applications that have similar screenshots, names and
descriptions as queried application but are not included in Intersect(I,S,N,D).
Since these sets contain very similar applications from different developers, they are
considered as camouflaged applications. Nonetheless, there can also be false alarms, where
the result set contains non-camouflaged applications. False alarms are created because in-
formation retrieval methods cannot differentiate them, although they are obvious to normal
users that they are not camouflaged applications.
5.5 Experiment and Results
Out of 30,625 applications, we find that 477 applications (1.56%) have 1 to 6 camouflaged
applications. Figure 5.2 shows the exact number of camouflaged application from each
result set. According to the figure, we can see that Intersect(I,S,N,D), Intersect(I,N,D)
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Figure 5.3: Example of Detected Camouflaged Application
and Intersect(S,N,D) reports more camouflaged applications than Intersect(I,S,N) and In-
tersect(I,S,D) methods.
An example of detected camouflaged applications, namely “VTX Mobile Dialer” and
“OneSuite Mobile Dialer”, is shown in Figure 5.3. The two applications have the very
similar screenshots, application name and description. Thus, they are reported in Inter-
sect(S,N,D) set. However, they use different developer IDes as well as different con-
tact information. The developer website and email address of “VTX Mobile Dialer” are
https://www.vtxtelecom.com/ and mobileapp@vtxtelecom.com. On the other hand, the de-
veloper website and email address of “VTX Mobile Dialer” are http://www.onesuite.com/
and mobileapp@onesuite.com. Although they claim to be from different companies, their
user interfaces are suspiciously similar. Therefore, they are regarded as camouflaged appli-
cations.
Determining the False Alarms: Determining the false positives and false negatives for
camouflaged applications is a challenge, as we do not have any ground truth samples. Thus,
we decide to do manual inspection on the result sets to determine the false positives. Though
tedious, expert manual inspection has been a common way to test the efficiencies of infor-
mation retrieval systems. To our surprise, a lot of the reported camouflaged applications
have almost identical user interfaces. This makes our manual inspection easier.
Our manual inspection shows that the result sets contain a total of 44 false positives,
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Figure 5.4: Example of False-Positive Camouflaged Applications
which is 9.22% of reported camouflaged applications. However, false positives exist only in
the Intersect(I,N,D) and Intersect(S,N,D). Intersect(I,N,D) contains 21 false positive sam-
ples and Intersect(S,N,D) contains 23 false positive samples. No false positive applications
have been identified in Intersect(I,S,N,D), Intersect(I,S,N) and Intersect(I,S,D), which con-
sider the similarity of both icons and screeenshots. This indicates that icons and screenshot
similarity measures are great indicators of camouflaged applications.
Figure 5.4 shows an example of false alarm applications, called “Fake Coin - You always
win!” and “Coin Toss”. Although their user interfaces are similar, it is quite obvious to the
real users that they provide different functions: the former application is for tricking friends
and the latter application is for randomly tossing the coin. Therefore, these two applications
should not be regarded as camouflaged applications.
5.6 Discussion
In this section, we will discuss about our findings on camouflaged applications as well as
limitations of our method and future work.
Feature Selection in Detection Method: Our detection method is limited to camou-
flaged applications with at least three similar features. Nonetheless, there can still be cam-
93
ouflaged applications with only one or two similar features. For instance, there are camou-
flaged applications with only similar icons. Although our method can be easily extended to
find applications with one or two similar features, many applications use very simple and
easily searchable icons, such as a light bulb. Consequently, there are a lot of false alarms
when we use only two features. Thus, it is still a challenge on how to ensure quality control
on icons and names of applications in the market.
Applications from Open-Source Projects: Our result shows that there are applica-
tions, which are modified from open-source projects, such as e-book readers, music players
and map applications. Although they use different contents, such different books or songs,
and change the themes, the applications are still highly similar as they use source codes
from the same projects. Thus, although they do not copy from each other, they are still
considered as camouflaged applications in our framework.
Applications with Different Versions: We find out that some camouflaged applications
claim to be different versions from one another. They use version differentiating words, such
as “HD” (High Definition), “full”, “II” (two), “plus” and “pro”. However, many of them
do not provide additional functionalities, although they claim to be upgraded versions. It
is possible that a malicious attacker tries to attract more customers by claiming to provide
upgraded version of the victim application. To solve this problem, application markets
should enforce that developers use the same account, when they claim to provide upgraded
version of an existing application. Our detection framework for camouflaged applications
can serve as an automatic policy enforcement mechanism for these kind of applications.
Internationalized Applications: Another finding of our experiment is that many in-
ternational companies, such as banks, have different applications developed for different
countries and languages. Unfortunately, they also use different developer ID in Google Play
to update them. For instance, “Banco Weng Hang, S.A.” application uploaded by “Banco
Weng Hang, S.A.” provides banking services in Chinese, while “Wing Hang Bank” appli-
cation uploaded by “Wing Hang Bank Ltd” provides the same services in English. This
is actually a vulnerability, which allows attackers to impersonate as legitimate applications
and launch phishing attacks.
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5.7 Related Work
Studies on the repackaged applications have become popular recently. Zhou et. al. [104]
studies 1260 Android malwares and finds out that 1083 malwares are repackaged appli-
cations. Balanza et al.[8] analyzes a repackaged malware, called DroidDreamLight and
states that trojanizing or repackaging is common form of infection in Android market. Jung
et al. [47] launches repackaging attack on bank applications. Moreover, Vidas et al. [83]
shows that some malwares are even repackaged with the valid certificates from original de-
velopers. It also proposes an authentication protocol for market applications which makes
it difficult for an attacker to perform repackaging.
Chen et al. [13] also studies the underground economy of Android application plagia-
rism. Similarly, Gibler et al. [34] studies the impact of repackaged applications and finds
out that 14% of original developers’ revenues and 10% of user based are redirected to the
attacker. Zheng et al. [97] presents various obfuscation techniques which allow automatic
repackaging of original malwares to different variants. Transformed malwares are then used
to test the robustness of Android anti-virus systems. Potharaju et al. [74] uses permission
information and estimates that 29.4% of applications are likely to be plagiarized. They also
detect repackaged applications using Deckard [46], which is a tree-based detection algo-
rithm of cloned codes.
DroidMOSS [101] and Juxtapp [40] [52] and apply fuzzy hashing on program instruc-
tion sequence and derive the similarity score by calculating the edit distance between two
generated fingerprints. Crussell et al. [16] proposes DNADroid, which uses Program De-
pendence Graph(PDG) to determine code similarity. DNADroid is similar to our approach
because it filters the applications based on application names, packages, markets, owners
and descriptions. However, such filtering is performed only to make the PDG comparison
more scalable for determining the similarity between two applications.
AnDarwin [17] applies Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH) to detect the repackaged ap-
plications. Zhou et al. [100] calls repackaged applications as “piggybacked” applications
and proposes linearithmic search algorithm in a metric space to detect them. Desnos et
al. [22] proposes an algorithm, which uses Normalized Compression Distance (NCD) to
analyze the similarity and differences between two Android applications. Similarly, Lin et
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al. [54] apply thread-grained system call sequences to detect repackaged applications. Ko et
al. [49] extract k-gram based software birthmarks from the dissembled codes and measure
the similarity of DEX files.
Huang et al. [43] proposes an evaluation framework for detection algorithms of repack-
aged application by measuring their resilience to obfuscation methods. Different from other
approaches, [99] proposes to use software watermarking to prevent repackaging. In sum-
mary, researchers have proposed different ways of detecting repackaged applications by
measuring the source code similarity or software watermarking. However, none of them
have yet considered camouflaged applications, which have very similar user interfaces, in-
stead of similar source codes.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter highlights the existence of camouflaged applications in mobile application mar-
kets as well as their exposed risk on application users and developers. Although there have
been papers about repackaged applications and their copy-right infringement, our work is
the first to introduce the concept of camouflaged applications and consider their user in-
terface similarity. Our work describes a proper threat model of camouflaged applications,
including their attack scenarios and attackers’ motivations. Moreover, we propose a sim-
ple, yet effective, detection framework, which applies text and image retrieval systems that
are accurate and scalable in detecting camouflaged applications. The proposed framework
is tested and the experiment result shows that 477 applications are camouflaged. We ana-
lyze these camouflaged applications, discuss their behaviors and calculate the false alarm
rates. Our work shows that detecting camouflaged applications is important, not only for
maintaining a safe mobile application market but also for controlling the quality of mobile
applications.
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Chapter 6
Dissertation Conclusion and Future
Work
6.1 Summary of Contribution
This dissertation makes contributions on vulnerability analysis of mobile application frame-
works and detection mechanisms on policy-violating applications.
Our first work focuses on finding vulnerabilities and launching attacks on iOS frame-
work. We proposes generic attack vectors that can be launched on iOS by an approved
third-party application. During attacks, an attacker bypasses vetting process and sandbox
mechanisms by dynamically loading frameworks and invoking C functions. We provide
several proof-of-concept attacks using these attack vectors. The results of our first work
have been reported to Apple’s iOS security team. They have been acknowledged by Ap-
ple and included in news media. The work has also published in the 11th International
Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS 2013).
Our second work proposes to find vulnerabilities in Android framework by uncovering
unprotected APIs. Several analysis, including call graph analysis, component analysis and
data flow analysis, are performed to retrieve unprotected APIs. After that, we launched
several proof-of-concepts attacks on Android devices. Our findings have been reported to
Google and Google has publicly acknowledged our contribution in its Security Bulletin.
This work has been published in the 14th International Conference on Privacy, Security and
97
Trust (PST 2016).
Our third work performs empirical analysis on policy-violating applications. This is the
first time in literature to analyze the categories and behaviors of real-life samples of policy-
violating applications. We also propose several features that can be used to detect policy-
violating applications with machine learning algorithms. This work has been published in
the 11th International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software (Malcon 2016). It
is also filed for patent with Hua Wei at the time when this dissertation was submitted.
Our fourth work detects camouflaged applications, which violate intellectual property
policies of application markets. Text similarity and image similarity scores are used to detect
these applications. The work is published in the 17th Annual International Conference on
Information Security and Cryptology (ICISC-2014).
This dissertation shows several weaknesses in the security of mobile frameworks, and
proposes various ways of improvements in ensuring security and privacy of mobile users.
6.2 Future Direction
We identify the following future directions:
6.2.1 Improvement on Current Vulnerability Analysis
An interesting way to extend our analysis is to assign a risk level to each vulnerability
discovered. Clearly, not every unprotected API poses a high risk. The risk level may be
calculated based on the nature of an exposed API, such as whether it accesses Kernel files.
We may also use heuristics in categorizing vulnerable APIs. For example, if an exposed API
contains source codes related to accessing Content Provider and returning results, it should
be categorized as potential privacy leakage. More effort in this aspect should be made so as
to develop an industry standard for evaluating and protecting mobile framework APIs.
6.2.2 Vulnerability Analysis on Other Frameworks
One of our future directions in this field is to discover framework-level vulnerabilities in
smart watches, smart TVs and smart cars, since they are also based on Android mobile
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systems, such as Android Auto and Android Wear. IOT platforms, such as Brillo, are also
interesting to explore for security vulnerabilities. When new systems are added into mobile
infrastructure, it make it more difficult and complex to preserve the security and privacy of
mobile users. Currently, there are no standard vulnerability analysis tools specifically de-
signed for these new systems, and creating these tools will be extremely helpful in ensuring
security and privacy of mobile users. ach vulnerability analysis will be tailored towards
specific systems, since their security mechanisms are different from others.
6.2.3 Vulnerability Analysis on Third-Party APIs
Another interesting future direction is to extend our study to third-party applications. Like
system services, some third-party applications provide AIDL interfaces to other third-party
applications. For example, many APIs are provided by Google Play services, including
Google Map, Google Plus, In-App Billing, and Google Wallet. Although such services are
not part of Android platform, they are supported by most Android mobile devices. Another
example is Dropbox, which allows other applications to access and manipulate a user’s
Dropbox account. It remains interesting to investigate the unprotected APIs of the AIDL
interfaces provided by vendor applications, such as Google Play services and other third-
party applications, such as Dropbox.
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